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Trademark Protection: Judicial
Inconsistency in the Fifth Circuit
By Julius R. Lunsford, Jr.*

and
William R. Cohrs**

I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff-appellant has had the misfortune ...
to come before a panel of
this Court allergic to the doctrine historically associated with us because
of its nurture by our most illustrious judges . . . of protecting trade
names [trademarks] against competition which will create confusion as to
the source of goods sold under such names. The chance of the assignment calendar which has so operated against plaintiff might as easily
have brought it success, to judge by the three most recent cases on this
issue before us, the unanimous decision in each instance. . . of another
panel. ...
This natural development could be somewhat ameliorated if
we adopted the practice I have urged of sitting en banc on special occasions, though obviously it cannot really be controlled until the Supreme
Court decides to exercise its constitutional power in these premises.'

Partner in the firm of Hurt, Richardson, Garner, Todd & Cadenhead, Atlanta, Georgia.
Mercer University; University of Georgia (J.D., 1936). Member of State Bar of Georgia and
the District of Columbia Bar; President, United States Trademark Association (1971-72).
** Associate in the firm of Hurt, Richardson, Garner, Todd & Cadenhead, Atlanta, Georgia. Michigan State University (B.S., 1972; M.S. 1974); University of Virginia (J.D., 1980).
Member of State Bar of Georgia.
Prefatory Note: As general reference works in the field of trademarks and unfair competition, the authors recommend: J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICES (1974); J.
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR CoMPrmON (1973); B. PATTISHALL AND D. HILLARD,
TRADEMARKS, TRADE IDENTITY AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES (1974). Lunsford, TrademarksAn Overview is a paper available from the United States Trademark Association which was
delivered on October 2, 1977, at the Trademark Basics Forum at Reston, Virginia, in which
Mr. Lunsford summarized the most significant trademark cases which have been decided by
the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals.
1. Hyde Park Clothes, Inc. v. Hyde Park Fashions, Inc., 204 F.2d 223, 226-27 (2d Cir.
1953) (Clark, J., dissenting) (footnote and citations omitted). See Lunsford, Lanham Act
Conflict and Dissent, 43 TRADEMARK REP. 995, 1004-5 (1953); Lunsford, Trademark In*
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Unfortunately, the quotation above, written in 1953 by a late Second
Circuit judge, is equally applicable today in the Fifth Circuit. After many
years of well-founded decisions applying the Lanham Act' and common
law rules of unfair competition,8 certain panels of the Fifth Circuit have,
in recent years, demonstrated disregard for the Fifth Circuit's own precedents, for well-reasoned authority from other circuits, and for the ability
of district court judges to find facts and draw appropriate conclusions of
law.4 This proposition will be demonstrated and exemplified in the discussion below.
It is also unfortunate that the Supreme Court has continued to abdicate its responsibilities to resolve conflicts between the circuit courts and
to provide authoritative interpretation of the Lanham Act.5 A reversal by
the Supreme Court might provide the impetus needed to convince the
Fifth Circuit that traditional doctrine is to be applied and ad hoc decision-making will not be tolerated. The failure of the Supreme Court to
review trademark decisions effectively makes the circuit courts of appeal
the courts of last resort.

What is the essence of the traditional doctrine to be applied in trademark infringement and unfair competition cases? The Supreme Court,
when it considered protecting these valuable symbols that represent good

fringement and Confusion of Source: Need for Supreme Court Action, 35 VA. L. REv. 214
(1949).
2. The Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976).
3. In 1969, the late Professor Walter J. Derenberg indicated that the "Fifth Circuit
would presently appear to be the most favorable jurisdiction for a plaintiff in a trademark
and unfair competition case." Derenberg, The Twenty-Second Year of Administration of
the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 59 T'1RADsss
Rzp. 625, 690 (1969). The Trademark
Bar needs no introduction to the eminent Walter J. Derenberg. To other readers, he was the
author of TR nsswK PROTECTION AND UNuAm CoMPrmoN (1936). He was a professor at
New York University for approximately forty years and taught a regular course in trademarks and unfair competition for the first time in any American law school. He was a proponent of the Lanham Act and wrote the annual reports of administration of the Lanham
Act for twenty-five years. See 38 TAzmAK REP. through 63 TRADMARK REP. He supervised the publication of the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh annual reports and planned
the twenty-eighth but died on September 9, 1975, prior to its publication. Hereafter, the
reports will be cited as, e.g., Derenberg, Tii Twrm"-FnTH YAR ... See 65 TRADEMARK
REP. v (1975) for some of Professor Derenberg's numerous honors and contributions.
4. See, e.g., Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
101 S.Ct. 268 (1980) (trial court's findings regarding likelihood of confusion reversed on
grounds of being clearly erroneous); Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d
496 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 932 (1979) (judge and jury findings regarding likelihood
of confusion reversed on grounds of being clearly erroneous); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday
Out in America, 481 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1973) (affirming the district court's denial of injunctive relief to the nationally known plaintiff on the basis of no likelihood of confusion).
5. A recent example is the Domino case, 615 F.2d 252 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct.
268 (1980).
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will and that identify publicly accepted brand name products, has provided some authoritative pronouncements:
There is no property in a trade-mark apart from the business or trade in
connection with which it is employed.
The law of trade-marks is but a part of the broader law of unfair competition . .. , the general purpose of which is to prevent one person from
passing off his goods or his business as the goods or business of another.'
[A trademark] is a distinguishable token devised or picked out with the
intent to appropriate it to a particular class of goods and with the hope
that it will come to symbolize good will.
In addition, the Supreme Court recognized, in 1879, that Congress has
the power to legislate on the subjects of trademarks under the commerce
clauses of the Constitution."0
It should be obvious to even the most casual observer that a well
known trademark such as COCA-COLA is worth millions of dollars to the
user, yet some judges seem to dismiss the importance of trademark and
unfair competition law as "not an altogether vaporous area of the law"'"
and declare that there is "little that is absolutely clear as a matter of law
in this case, or in most unfair competition suits."1 ' Indeed, it is clear as a

matter of law that a business competitor may not create a likelihood of
confusion in the collective mind of the consuming public as to the source
or origin of his goods or services" or falsely describe or represent his
goods or services." Protection of the public is the paramount policy objective of trademark and unfair competition law,'6 and the interests of the
public and of the injured business competitor coincide when an in6. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918). See Hanover Star
Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413-414 (1916).
7. American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 380 (1926) (citations omitted).
8. Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 273 U.S. 629, 632 (1927).
9. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
10. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93 (1879).
11. B.H. Bunn Co. v. AAA Replacement Parts Co., 451 F.2d 1254, 1258 (5th Cir. 1971)
(J. Goldberg's opinion for the court); see also the lighthearted treatment exhibited by Judge
John R. Brown in Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1979)
in which he begins his opinion, "In this case, we fly by magic carpet through the exotic and
esoteric realm of trademark law.
Id. at 498.
12. 451 F.2d at 1267.
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(d), 1114(1) (1976).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976).
15. "It is well settled that one of the purposes which the law intends to subserve when it
gives a right to an injured person to protection from unfair competition and provides a
remedy to bring about such protection, is to afford protection also to the general public."
Norman M. Morris Corp. v. Weinstein, 466 F.2d 137, 140 (5th Cir. 1972). Accord, Norwich
Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569, 570-71 (2d Cir. 1959).
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fringer's unfair method of competition is challenged. The rights of the
individual consumer are certainly protected when he can be certain that a
particular mark denotes "a single thing coming from a single source."'"
He has the right to avoid the product or service in the future if it has
been unsatisfactory. He is entitled to select the product the quality of
which has served him satisfactorily. The honest competitor likewise
desires that his mark attract repeat customers. As Judge Learned Hand
sagaciously noted:
If another uses it [the mark], he borrows the owner's reputation, whose
quality no longer lies within his own control. This is an injury, even
though the borrower does not tarnish it, or diverkany sales by its use; for
a reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and creator, and
another can use it only as a mask. And so it has come to be recognized
that, unless the borrower's use is so foreign to the owner's as to insure
against any identification of the two, it is unlawful."
Prior to examining the "modern" Fifth Circuit trademark and unfair
competition cases, i.e., decided under the Lanham Act, it is necessary to
ascertain if the Fifth Circuit judiciary heeded the principles underlying
Judge Hand's well-reasoned admonition before the enactment of the Lanham Act. A pre-Lanham Act case, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Aetna
Auto Finance,Inc.,18 illustrates the status of the law in the Fifth Circuit
prior to the passage of the Lanham Act.1 ' In Aetna, the nationally known
plaintiff-insurance company brought suit against a local auto finance
company doing business under the AETNA name in Birmingham, Alabama. The defendant represented itself in its advertising as having national connections, thus giving the impression that it was in some manner
affiliated with, or sponsored or approved by, plaintiff. The trial court relied on the findings of a special master and denied plaintiff injunctive
relief because no actual competition existed between the two parties. The
plaintiff sold insurance of all types, and defendant primarily financed
automobiles, but also sold some insurance coverage as a sideline. Reversing the trial court, Judge Hutcheson correctly determined that the case
turned on "whether the evidence as a whole furnishes reasonable ground
for the belief that there is a probability that persons may be deceived by
the use of the name into thinking that there is a connection between
16. See American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 12 (5th Cir.
1974); Aloe Creme Labs, Inc. v. Wilson, Inc., 423 F.2d 845, 849 (5th Cir. 1970).
17. Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928).
18. 123 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1941) (hereinafter referred to as Aetna).
19. Prior to the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976), the federal trademark statute was the Trademark Act of 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724 (1905).

TRADEMARK PROTECTION

1171

plaintiff and the defendant. . . ,, 0 Abhorring the elements of unjust en-

richment found in defendant's "project[ing] itself into that business
arena panoplied in a name already favorably known rather than to come
into it on its own merits, and slowly building, here a little, there a little,
establish[ing] its own place,"' the court refused to allow defendant to
"reap where one has not sown, to gather where one has not planted, to
build upon the work and reputation of another, the use of the advertising
,2
or trade name or distinguishing mark of another ....
The court's expression, "reasonable ground for the belief that there is a
probability that persons may be deceived,"' "2closely parallels the current
statutory standard of likelihood of confusion." Moreover, it adhered to
Judge Hand's philosophy that the junior user should not be allowed to
benefit from the confusing use of a mark or name established by another's work, toil and effort. In fact, Judge Hutcheson recited Judge
citation or
Hand's now famous "face-and-mask" line without quotation,
5
"principle."'1
a
as
instead
it
to
referring
attribution,
The principles enunciated thus far provide the true, right and intellectually pure bases of analysis in this area of law. The decisions of the Fifth
Circuit from 195021 through 1980 will be reviewed to ascertain the Fifth
Circuit's record for applying these principles.
II.

1950-1959: FINDING THE WAY

One's interest in a trade-mark or trade name came to be protected
against simulation, *** not only on competing goods, but on goods so
related in the market to those on which the trade-mark or trade name is
used that the good or ill repute of the one type of goods is likely to be
visited upon the other. Thus one's interest in a trade-mark or trade name
is protected against being subjected to the hazards of another's
business. 17
The quotation above comes from one of the best opinions of the 1950's,
Pure Foods, Inc. v. Minute Maid Corp.'8 While this opinion and others
20. 123 F.2d at 584.
21. Id. (emphasis supplied).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(d), 1114(1) (1976).
25. 123 F.2d at 582.
26. 1950 was selected as the year to begin this review because the Lanham Act became
effective July 5, 1947. It took until 1950 for the normal litigation process to produce an
opinion at the circuit court level using the Lanham Act as the basis for decision.
27. Pure Foods, Inc. v. Minute Maid Corp., 214 F.2d 792, 796-97 (5th Cir. 1954), quoting
from RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 730, Comment a (1938).
28. 214 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1954) (hereinafter referred to as Minute Maid).
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effectively implemented the policies underlying the Lanham Act, several
decisions missed the mark, leaving the 1950's as a decade of vacillation,
but showing some promise for the future.
A.

When is a Similar Name for the Same Goods or Services Confusing?

In 1957, the court established that a mark identical to a registered
mark except for the changing of one letter, i.e., CARO vice CORO, was
confusingly similar and its use should be enjoined.2 Plaintiff owned a registration for CORO dating back to 1921. It sold costume jewelry to retail
stores which then resold the jewelry to the public under the name CORO.
Defendant Abramson purchased a jewelry store in Biloxi, Mississippi, and
started doing business under the name CARO and Caro Jewelry Co., even
using a script CARO in imitation of plaintiff's registered script CORO. In
affirming the trial court's issuance of an injunction, Judge Borah said for
the court:
The authorities are legion in holding that proof of actual deception is not
needed to justify an injunction against the use of a trademark if it is of
such a character or used in such a way as to be likely to deceive a prospective purchaser, and that the similarity of sound as well 30as appearance may be taken into account in weighing this probability.
Evidently, the authorities became legion in the short period of two
years because in 1955 a panel consisting of Chief Judge Hutcheson and
Judges Brown and Tuttle held that, under Florida law, the unregistered
trade name DANDY used for bread was not infringed by DANDEE, a
phonetic equivalent also used for bread, despite DANDY having acquired
a secondary meaning in its market area. 1 The court was evidently persuaded by the facts that the bread wrappers exhibited different color
schemes and that the defendant at trial affirmatively disproved likelihood
of confusion, a feat which is, at best, difficult to accomplish because it
requires proving a negative. The finding seems questionable in light of
the trial court's finding that plaintiff's sales had actually increased since
defendant's introduction of its bread into plaintiff's market,82 a fact
8s
which seemingly would have supported a finding of "reverse confusion. 1
29. Abramson v. Coro, Inc., 240 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1957).
30. Id. at 857.
31. Webb's City, Inc. v. Bell Bakeries, Inc., 226 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1955). The court relied
in part on Creamette Co. v. Conlin, 191 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1951), but that case is distinguishable because defendant's use of CREAMETTE was found to be descriptive of defendant's imitation or substitute ice cream, whereas plaintiff had registered CREAMETTES
for macaroni. DANDEE is not descriptive of bread.
32. 226 F.2d at 701.
33. See, e.g., Capital Films Corp. v. Charles Fries Productions, Inc., 628 F.2d 387 (5th
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While not of much solace to plaintiff, this decision so worked on the conscience of Judge John R. Brown that twenty-five years later he publicly
apologized for the erroneous decision he helped render."
A case presenting more difficult facts was Crown Overall Manufacturing Co. v. Chahin.85 In that case, the court affirmed the trial court's decision denying injunctive relief because the mark HEADALL, used on overalls, did not infringe plaintiff's federally registered trademarks,
HEADIES and HEADLIGHTS, which were also used on overalls but in
conjunction with a dominant railroad engine headlamp beam design,
prior to defendant's use of HEADALL. While defendant used the word
HEADALL alone, the court found that plaintiff's use of a headlamp beam
design created a lasting impression such that there was no likelihood of
confusion between the two marks. Had plaintiff used the word marks
alone, without the design, the case would have been more difficult to decide. It is the opinion of the authors that the court reached the correct
conclusion.
B.

Protection of Strong and Weak Marks Used on Related Goods

The previous discussion dealt with slight variations in marks used on
identical or nearly identical goods. Harder questions arise when the same
or similar mark is used on noncompeting but related goods. The perceived strength of the mark determines its scope of protection." A strong
mark is a coined word such as EXXON or a word which is arbitrary or
distinctive as applied to the goods or services it identifies; the mark must
not describe the qualities or characteristics of its associated product or
service. A descriptive mark may deserve protection as a strong mark if,
through long and exclusive use and extensive advertising, it has come to
be associated with the source of the product or service, i.e., the mark has
acquired a secondary meaning.87 A weak mark, on the other hand, is not
distinctive, may often be descriptive, geographically descriptive, or a personal name which has not acquired a secondary meaning. A mark may be
Cir. 1980), discussed in text accompanying note 317 infra; Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977), discussed in text accompanying
note 315 infra.
34. See Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exchange of Houston, Inc., 628 F.2d 500 (5th Cir.
1980) (Brown, J., dissenting), discussed in text accompanying note 391 infra.
35. 200 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1953).
36. One element to be considered in determining whether a mark is strong or weak is
whether it is classified as generic, descriptive, suggestive, or arbitrary. See Soweco, Inc. v.
Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1980) for a recent discussion of these categories. See
also Lunsford, Trademark Basics, 59 TIDmEARK Rzp. 873 (1969).
37. See American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3 (5th Cir.
1974). For a discussion of ways to prove secondary meaning, see Lunsford, The Mechanics
of Proof of Secondary Meaning, 60 Tnmnzss
REP. 263 (1970).
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defined as a weak mark because a number of third parties use the same
mark in both related and unrelated fields, thus diluting 8 the distinctiveness of the mark. A strong mark deserves more protection against unauthorized use or imitation than a weak mark because it unmistakably identifies the source of the product, thus it is more valuable to the infringer.
With the unlimited universe of names and symbols available to one who
wishes to engage in business, there is no plausible reason to allow the
junior user to trade on and benefit from the established name of the
senior user. The junior user should not be allowed to "reap where [he]
has not sown"' nor use the established name as a "mask."'"
In Minute Maid,' the court affirmed a district court decision prohibiting the defendant from distributing frozen meat products under the mark
MINUTE MADE because the mark was confusingly similar to the federally registered mark MINUTE MAID used for frozen juice products. The
court rejected the argument that the products must compete directly for
confusion to result.' 2 Defendant's protestations that MINUTE MADE
was merely descriptive of the time required to prepare the frozen steaks
met the same fate. Finding that the mark MINUTE MAID had acquired
a secondary meaning in the eyes of the public, and because defendant's
products were sold through the same retail outlets to the same class of
purchasers, often in close proximity to plaintiff's products, Judge Rives
said for the court: "We think that the infringement would subject the
goodwill and reputation of the plaintiff's trade-mark to the hazards of the
defendant's business .... .
While the court reached the proper conclusion, it was unnecessary to
consider secondary meaning. MINUTE MAID was and is an arbitrary
mark as applied to frozen juice products. A federally registered mark
should be protected against use by blatant imitators without proof of secondary meaning." The statutory standard is likelihood of confusion."
The secondary meaning doctrine should be applied only when dealing
with marks which describe a product's qualities or characteristics in order
to provide a means of protecting a mark which has, through use, advertising, and public acceptance, come to denote the source of the product."
38. A number of states have passed anti-dilution statutes; see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 106115 (1968). See Lunsford, The Mechanics of Proof of Secondary Meaning, 60 TRADEMARK
REP. 263 (1970).
39. Aetna, 123 F.2d at 584.
40. Yale Electric, 26 F.2d at 974.
41. 214 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1954).
42. Id. at 796-97. See note 27 supra, and accompanying text.
43. Id. at 796.
44. See, e.g., Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 46 (5th Cir. 1975).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1976).
46. See Lunsford, The Mechanics of Proof of Secondary Meaning, 60 TRADEMARK REP.
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In John Walker & Sons Ltd. v. Tampa Cigar Co.,47 the makers of
JOHNNIE WALKER Scotch whisky successfully enjoined the use of its
celebrated trademark on cigars. In a fairly brief opinion looking at the
trial court's findings only to see if they were clearly erroneous, '8 the Fifth
Circuit approved the trial court's analysis, which found that whisky and
cigars were closely related in distribution and use and that defendant's
use of JOHNNIE WALKER was likely to cause confusion as to the
source of the cigars, or to indicate some sponsorship by or affiliation with
the plaintiff.4 The trial court emphasized the public celebrity of the
mark and recited the amount of money spent on advertising by plaintiff,
as if trying to prove secondary meaning. Plaintiff should have been required to prove only that its registered marks were valid and that the
cigars moved through the same or closely related channels of trade to the
same purchasers. The fame or celebrity of the mark is irrelevant when
one considers an arbitrary mark such as JOHNNIE WALKER, which
represents the original founder of the company and is not descriptive or
even suggestive of whisky.
Two restaurant cases and a "squirrel" case demonstrate the court's
treatment of conflicts involving weak marks. All three were decided for
the defendants, correctly denying injunctive relief. In El Chico, Inc. v. El
Chico Cafe, 50 plaintiff, a New York night club serving Spanish food, tried
to enjoin, on common law grounds, the use of EL CHICO in connection
with several Mexican restaurants in Texas and Louisiana and in connection with a canning business. Affirming the trial court's dismissal of the
complaint against the Mexican restaurants and reversing the trial court's
decision to enjoin the use by the canning company, Judge Rives relied on
the fact that "Chico" is a common Spanish name and, therefore, a weak
mark in the absence of a showing of secondary meaning. Because the New
York club was not known in Texas and Louisiana, there was no likelihood
263 (1970).
47. 124 F. Supp. 254 (S.D. Fla. 1954), afl'd, 222 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1955) (hereinafter
cited as Johnnie Walker).
48. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
49. Accord, Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.
1963) (reversing trial court's denial of injunction against defendant for using famous
BLACK & WHITE mark (for Scotch whisky) on beer, even though different class of purchasers found-likelihood of confusion as to source, sponsorship, or affiliation); John Walker
& Sons, Ltd. v. American Tobacco Co., 110 U.S.P.Q. (B.N.A.) 249 (Dec. Com. Pat. 1956)
(reversing the dismissal of an opposition to the registration of JOHNNIE WALKER for
cigarettes-registration refused under sections 2(a) and 2(d) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1052(a), 1052(d) (1976)). Cf. John Walker & Sons Ltd. v. Modern Shoe Co., 213 F.2d 322
(C.C.P.A. 1954) (upholding the dismissal of opposition to registration of JOHNNIE
WALKER for men's and boys' shoes-no likelihood of confusion between shoes and
whisky).
50. 214 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1954).

1176

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

of confusion resulting from the defendant's use of EL CHICO in the restaurant business.51 The canning business vitiated any likelihood of confusion by including on its labels "Mexican Brand Food Made in Texas."
Similarly, no likelihood of confusion resulted from, and hence no relief
was granted for, the concurrent use of WHITE KITCHEN for restaurants because plaintiff's business was confined to Louisiana and defendant's business was confined to Florida. 2 Finding no violation of the Lanham Act, Judge Cameron emphasized that registration of a trademark or
service mark confers only procedural advantages and does not enlarge the
registrant's substantive rights. Ownership of a trademark rests on adoption and use, not on registration."0 From this case it is obvious that the
plaintiff in El Chico" would not have been any more successful had he
had a registered mark. Without at least likelihood of confusion, no cause
of action exists at common law or under the Lanham Act.
The court also refused to enjoin the use of a picture of a squirrel on
packages of nuts and nut meats when the squirrel was used only in conjunction with defendant's name, Barnard Nut Company, and its phrase,
"Nuttee Foods."55 Although plaintiff owned a registered trademark consisting of SQUIRREL plus a squirrel design which was used on its packages of nuts, nut products and candies, Judge Cameron found that defendant's squirrel picture was not a colorable imitation of plaintiff's design
and that, while a squirrel was not descriptive of nuts, a squirrel was universally associated with nuts in the public mind. Because no likelihood of
confusion existed, neither did a basis for an injunction.
C.

Who Determines Likelihood Of Confusion?

Two conflicting Fifth Circuit decisions during the same year provide
the background for the heading of this subsection. In Seaboard Finance
Co. v. Martin," the court held that a state's granting of a corporate charter to a junior user was not an adjudication of likelihood of confusion as
to the corporate name. However, the approval of an insurance company
name by the Texas State Board of Insurance Commissioners was given
great weight by the court in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. All States Life Ins.
57
Co.

51. Cf. Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948) (pre-Lanham Act
decision enjoining the use of the name "Stork Club" in San Francisco on the basis of the
first user's nationwide reputation as a New York nightclub).
52. Faciane v. Starner, 230 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1956).
53. Id. at 738.
54. 214 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1954).
55. Squirrel Brand Co. v. Barnard Nut Co., 224 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1955).
56. 244 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1957).
57. 246 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1957).
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In Seaboard Finance, defendant had registered the trade name "Seaboard Finance Corporation" in Louisiana, but plaintiff, a prior user of the
name "Seaboard Finance Company" and an expanding national concern,
brought a challenge to the use of the name by the junior user. Reversing
the trial court's dismissal of the complaint and remanding for trial on the
issue of laches by plaintiff, the court correctly held that the state's action
did not preempt the adjudication of the issue of likelihood of confusion.5
Conversely, with some justification, but certainly without the necessity
to defer totally to the State Board of Insurance Commissioner's judgment, the court affirmed the trial court's decision denying relief for trademark infringement and unfair competition in the All States case. 9 Sears
owned the nationally known ALLSTATE mark, had used it for automobile and general casualty insurance since 1931, but, under Texas law, was
prohibited from selling life insurance under the same name. All States
Life Insurance Company was organized in 1955 and approved by the
State Board of Insurance Commissioners which, by state law, could register no name "likely to mislead the public."6 0 Giving the Board's action
substantial weight, Judge Tuttle, exhibiting a level of confusion possibly
as high as in the Dandee case, 61 held that there was no similarity of products (though both were in the insurance business), no similarity between
the mark ALLSTATE and defendant's trade name ALL STATES,'6 and
no competition between Sears and ALL STATES.63 Worst of all, Judge
Tuttle failed to mention a conflicting Third Circuit opinion rendered two
years earlier where that court reversed the trial court's dismissal of Sears'
complaint against the use of the name "All-State School of Driving" and
stated that "the interpolation of a hyphen into the word Allstate will
hardly distinguish the two names."" How could eliminating the hyphen,
allowing the now vacant space to remain, and adding an "s" to "State"
lead to a different result? Because the court stated that the federal court,
in applying the Lanham Act, was not bound by the determination of the
State Board of Insurance Commissioners, 65 the only logical conclusion is
that the court made an egregious error. At least Judge Jones had the sa58. 244 F.2d at 331-32.
59. 246 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1957).
60. Id. at 169.
61. 226 F.2d 700. See note 31 supra, and accompanying text.
62. Cf. Abramson v. Coro, Inc., 240 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1957) (CARO held sufficiently
similar to CORO to constitute infringement). See note 29 supra, and accompanying text.
63. Cf. Minute Maid, 214 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1954). (No direct competition required for
injunctive relief). See notes 41-46 supra, and accompanying text.
64. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Johnson, 219 F.2d 590, 592 (3d Cir. 1955) (an action for
tradename infringement-ALLSTATE was not registered as a service mark until 1956).
65. 246 F.2d at 172.
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gacity to dissent."
D. Use Of A Geographic Mark
Over two and one-half years were consumed trying to resolve whether
the mark BAMA could be used to designate defendant's blackberry wine
over the objection of plaintiff, the registrant of BAMA for preserves,
jams, jellies, mayonnaise, and peanut butter.6 7 The Fifth Circuit, through
Chief Judge Hutcheson, affirmed" the trial court's decision that BAMA
was primarily a geographic mark, being a nickname for Alabama, incapable of exclusive appropriation by anyone. The trial court determined that
there was no likelihood of confusion because many producers of various
products used the name BAMA, plaintiffs BAMA had not acquired a secondary meaning, and defendant's wine could be sold only through state
controlled liquor stores, not in grocery stores where plaintiff's goods were
sold.
If BAMA is merely a geographic mark as determined by the courts,
why were not plaintiffs registrations ordered cancelled? The courts certainly had the power under section 37 of the Lanham Act," and that section does not require a motion of any party to cancel such mark.7 0 A cancellation order would have affected an express policy of the Act, to deny
registration of a mark which, "when applied to the goods of the applicant
is primarily geographically descriptive . . ."' Failure to cancel plaintiff's
registration leads us to wonder if the courts were more impressed with
the geographic significance of BAMA or the multitude of third-party uses
of the mark,7" which led the trial court to find that the mark has "lost all
elements of originality and distinctiveness and has not acquired a secondary meaning ....
"73
66. Id. at 172-73 (Jones, J., dissenting).
67. Chappell v. Goltsman, 99 F. Supp. 970 (M.D. Ala. 1951) (trial on the merits denying
injunctive relief to plaintiff because BAMA was primarily a geographic mark incapable of
exclusive appropriation by anyone), af'd as modified, 197 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1952) (modifying trial court's decision to require defendant to strike "Brand" from its wine labels). Earlier the trial court had dismissed the complaint and stated that the pleadings did not make
out a case of trademark infringement or unfair competition, 88 F. Supp. 784 (M.D. Ala.,
rev'd and remanded, 186 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1950). The court of appeals remanded because
the motion for dismissal should have been treated as a motion for summary judgment, and
substantial factual issues were unresolved.
68. 197 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1952).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (1976).
70. There was originally a counterclaim for cancellation. 197 F.2d at 838.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2) (1976).
72. 99 F. Supp. at 975-76.
73. Id. at 976. For later conflicting views by the same judge on the subject of third-party
users, compare Turner v. HMH Publishing Co., 380 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1967) (J. Ainsworth's
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Another interesting aspect of this case is that, on final appeal, Chief
Judge Hutcheson ordered defendant to strike the word "Brand" from all
of its wine labels7" to make "doubly sure that no confusion resulting in
injury to plaintiffs will occur. '" 5 Query: Does the word "Brand" in some
way designate the source of the product or distinguish one product from
another? This ludicrous proviso violates the primary rule that every reputable trademark counsel insists that his clients follow, i.e., never designate a product by its trademark alone. It is SCOTCH brand tape, not
SCOTCH tape. Finally, it must be noted, that Judge Strum, in dissent,
had no trouble in concluding that the coloring, lettering, and general format of defendant's label indicated an obvious attempt to simulate plain76
tiff's label and to trade on plaintiff's established good will.
E. Jurisdiction
In the absence of an allegation of diversity of citizenship, 77 the trademark jurisdiction of the federal courts in the Fifth Circuit during the
1950's, and even the 1960's, was restricted to cases involving a trademark
or service mark registered under the Lanham Act. Yet the Third Circuit
held in 1954 that section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 8 created an independent cause of action. 79 In Royal Lace Paper Works, Inc. v.Pest-Guard
Products,Inc.,s0 Chief Judge Hutcheson held that section 44 of the Lanham Act8" did not create an independent cause of action for unfair competition and infringement of unregistered trademarks in the absence of
diversity of citizenship and of a registered mark, and hence, the federal
district court did not have jurisdiction over the claims.8 Section 44
clearly deals with the rights of foreign persons whose countries are signatories of treaties and conventions to which the United States is also a

majority opinion, third-party uses totally irrelevant) discussed in text accompanying note
136 infra, with Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1980) (J. Ainsworth's majority opinion, third-party uses are very relevant) discussed in text accompanying
note 388 infra.
74. 197 F.2d at 839.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 839-40 (Strum, J., dissenting).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976).
79. L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954).
80. 240 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1957).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (1976).
82. Accord, American Auto. Ass'n, 205 F.2d 771 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887
(1953); L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954). Contra,
Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith Kline & French Laboratories, 207 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1953);
Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952); Stauffer v. Exley, 184 F.2d 962
(9th Cir. 1950).

1180

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

signatory. Denying American citizens the right to protection under section 44 that is enjoyed by foreign nationals seemingly deprives domiciliaries of rights and remedies available to nondomiciliaries. Although a literal
reading of subsections 44(b), (h), and (i)8s seems to accord American citizens this right of protection, the Fifth Circuit made short shrift of the
contention. "[Ilt seems clear to us that to find in the language of that
wholly separate section [section 44] the comprehensive extension of the
scope of the act to include independent suits for unfair competition, is to
proceed hind end to, to make the tafl wag the dog."8 " Subsequently, the
Fifth Circuit recognized causes of action under the Lanham Act independent of an associated claim of infringement of a registered mark, but this
recognition came under the auspices of section 43(a) and did not occur
until 1971.85
The issue of the extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act arose in
Bulova Watch Co. v. Steele.8s Plaintiff, the world's largest watch manufacturer, had registered the well-known mark BULOVA in 1927. Defen-

dant, a United States citizen and resident of Texas, began purchasing
component parts in the United States and in Switzerland, then assembling the parts and affixing the BULOVA mark on his watches in Mexico,
where he had a trademark registration for BULOVA. Steele did not export the watches to the United States, but American tourists purchased
them in Mexico and brought them back to the United States, thus damaging Bulova's reputation in the United States when the watches were
83.

15 U.S.C. § 1126 (1976) provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Any person whose country of origin is a party to any convention or treaty
relating to trademarks, trade or commercial names, or the repression of unfair
competition, to which the United States is also a party, or extends reciprocal
rights to nationals of the United States by law, shall be entitled to the benefits of
this section under the conditions expressed herein to the extent necessary to give
effect to any provision of such convention, treaty or reciprocal law, in addition to
the rights to which any owner of a mark is otherwise entitled by this chapter.
(h) Any person designated in subsection (b) of this section as entitled to the
benefits and subject to the provisions of third chapter shall be entitled to effective
protection against unfair competition, and the remedies provided in this chapter
for infringement of marks shall be available so far as they may be appropriate in
repressing acts of unfair competition.

(i) Citizens or residents of the United States shall have the same benefits as are
granted by this section to persons described in subsection (b) of this section.
84. 240 F.2d at 820. Compare In re Lyndale Farm, 186 F.2d 723 (C.C.P.A. 1951). See
Lunsford, Unfair Competition: Scope of the Lanham Act, 13 Prrr. L. REv. 533 (1952), re-

printed at 42

TRADEMARK

REP. 815 (1952).

85. See Alum-A-Fold Shutter Corp. v. Folding Shutter Corp., 441 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.
1971), discussed in text accompanying note 283 supra.
86. 194 F.2d 567 (5th Cir.), aff'd 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
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discovered to be of inferior quality. The district court denied jurisdiction
because of the extraterritorial situs of the acts of infringement, but the
Fifth Circuit, through Judge Rives, over Judge Russell's dissent, reversed
on the bases that the effect on United States interstate and foreign commerce gave the federal court jurisdiction and that a national of any country is subject to its laws anywhere in the world so long as the commands
of the national's country do not conflict with the policies of the current
country of domicile. The court remanded with instructions that the district court Was to enjoin Steele from applying the BULOVA mark to
watches in Mexico. The Supreme Court affirmed, in an opinion by Justice
Clark from which Justices Douglas and Reed dissented, 7 the Court having the luxury of a recent ruling by the Supreme Court of Mexico,"8 not
rendered at the time of the Fifth Circuit decision, invalidating Steele's
Mexican registration of BULOVA and effectively precluding a direct conflict with the law of Mexico.
Overall the court did fairly well during the 1950's, justifiably protecting
the vested commercial interests of those who had developed a name or
mark of value through the investment of time and money. With the limitless combinations of letters, numerals, and symbols available to one who
desires to engage in business, there is simply no reason to allow him to
use a mark that is a colorable imitation of a mark made famous by someone else's efforts. The apex of the court's decisions was reached in the
Minute Maid8 and Johnnie Walker" decisions; the nadir in the All
States1 decision.
III.

1960-1969:

THE GOLDEN YEARS

The essence of competition is the ability of competing products to obtain
public recognition based on their own individual merit. A product has
not won on its own merits if the real reason the public purchases it is
that the public believes it is obtaining the product of another company."
With this statement Judge Rives essentially characterizes the court's
philosophy during a plaintiff-oriented, protectionist decade. In Chemical
Corp. v. Anheuser Busch, Inc.,"s National Association of Blue Shield
87. Id.
88. Sidney Steele v. Secretary of the National Economy, Anales. (1952).
89. 214 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1954). See note 27 supra, and accompanying text.
90. 222 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1955). See note 47 supra, and accompanying text.
91. 246 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1957). See note 57 supra, and accompanying text.
92. Standard Oil Co. (Kentucky) v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 363 F.2d 945, 954 (5th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1007 (1967).
93. 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1963), discussed in text
accompanying note 120 infra.
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Plans v. United Bankers Life Insurance Co.,94 Beaf/Eater Restaurants,

Inc. v. James Burrough Ltd.,95 Continental Motor Corp. v. Continental
Aviation Corp.,"9 Standard Oil Co. (Kentucky) v. Humble Oil & Refining
Co.,'9 and Turner v. HMH Publishing Co.,98 the court indicated it would
not temporize with the parasitic usurpers and imitators trying to obtain a
free ride. Of course, the court's record was not perfect. An egregious error
was made in Sun-Maid Raisin Growers v. Sunaid Food Products,Inc.,"
in which relief was denied the famous California cooperative raisin producer. However, the court demonstrated an increased understanding of
the principles upon which the Lanham Act is based and did not hesitate
to apply them.
A.

When is a Similar Name for the Same Goods or Services Confusing?

In Aloe Creme Laboratories,Inc. v. Texas Pharmacal Co.,100 the court
affirmed the decisions of the district court as well as the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board, 101 which had denied Aloe Creme Labs' applications to
register ALO-CREME, ALO-CREME AFTER TAN, and ALOE CREME.
The court of appeals based its decision upon actual confusion and likelihood of confusion with Texas Pharmacal's previously registered marks,
ALLERCREME and ALLERCREME SAF-TAN, for the same class of
goods, namely skin and beauty lotions and preparations. The district
court also granted Texas Pharmacal's counterclaim and enjoined the use
of Aloe's marks. The Fifth Circuit refused to give weight to the applicant's argument, antithetically argued in the earlier proceedings, that
ALO was descriptive'" because it was derived from and suggests the aloe
vera plant, which provided the main active ingredient in applicant's products. 0' The court, in declining to hold that the district court's de novo
decision was "clearly erroneous,"'" undoubtedly was influenced by the
94. 362 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1966), discussed in text accompanying note 110 infra.
95. 398 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1968), discussed in text accompanying note 125 infra.
96. 375 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1967), discussed in text accompanying note 131 infra.
97. 363 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1966), discussed in text accompanying note 177 infra.
98. 380 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1967), discussed in text accompanying note 136 infra.
99. 356 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1966), discussed in text accompanying note 113 infra.
100. 335 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1964).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1071 (1976) provides for appeals to and civil actions in the federal
courts following decisions of the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks or the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.
102. See 335 F.2d at 73, n.2. Of course, this argument could not have been made in the
earlier proceedings to register the marks because of the prohibition against registration of
"merely descriptive" marks, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (1976). This argument must have been
made only to attempt to forestall the requested injunction.
103. See the family of Aloe cases discussed at note 204 and accompanying text, infra.
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 52.
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earlier decision in the opposition proceeding in the Patent and Trademark Office.
In InternationalBrewers, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,'"5 the court refused to enjoin the use of BUSCH BAVARIAN BEER, except in the Cincinnati area where plaintiff's registered mark BAVARIAN'S, used on BAVARIAN'S SELECT BEER, had acquired a secondary meaning.
Although relief was denied a registered trademark owner, the decision accords with several well established principles of trademark law. First, Bavaria is a geographic region'" of Germany, a country which is famous for
its production of beer. Thus BAVARIAN'S is both geographically descriptive and product descriptive and cannot be acquired exclusively by
one user in the absence of secondary meaning.107 Second, the court noted
that the labels used on the two beers were totally dissimilar in overall
appearance, thus tending to obviate any likelihood of confusion. Third,
the facts that the plaintiff had used the mark only in the Cincinnati area
and that the restrictions on Anheuser-Busch's marketing were limited to
that area accords with the generally accepted Dawn Donut territorial
rights rule. 0 8s Adopted in the Fifth Circuit,' that rule states that in an
area where a federally registered trademark is not used, advertised, or
known, there can be no likelihood of confusion by another's use of the
mark. Use in a particular market area is still the paramount factor in
establishing a protectable interest in a trademark. Registration alone,
even federal registration, is not enough.
A service mark infringement problem presented itself in National Association of Blue Shield Plans v. United Bankers Life Insurance Co. 10
The Fifth Circuit, reversing the trial court's decision as clearly erroneous,
correctly held that the use of RED SHIELD and a shield design was
likely to cause confusion with the plaintiff's famous BLUE SHIELD and
shield sign marks, particularly since defendant was marketing hospital insurance, the same line of services offered by plaintiff. The case is famous
for its discussion of the intent of the infringer:

105. 364 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1966).
106. See Chappell v. Coltsman, 197 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1952) discussed in text accompanying note 68 supra.
107. See Continental Motors Corp. v. Continental Aviation Corp., 375 F.2d 857 (5th Cir.
1967), discussed in text accompanying note 131 infra. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (1976).
108. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
109. John R. Thompson Co. v. Holloway, 366 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1966), discussed in text
accompanying notes 150-152 infra; American Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619
(5th Cir. 1963).
110. 362 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1966). See also Bankers Commercial Life Ins. Co. v. American Hospital Ass'n, 403 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1968) (per curiam), in which the court affirmed
the district court's judgment that BLUE CROWN infringed the registered mark BLUE

CROSS.

1184

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

It seems clear from the similarity of the marks and the conduct outlined
above that the purpose of United Bankers was to use marks as close as
possible to those of the National Association, so as to appropriate the
goodwill and good name of the blue shield, while maintaining just sufficient a distinction between the marks to confuse, if possible, both the
public and the courts. Where such a purpose appears, the courts will follow the alleged infringer's judgment and find a likelihood of confusion."'
While some commentators have cited this passage as authority for the
proposition that a finding of intent alone is a sufficient basis for liability,
the court specifically did not so hold.'12
In a decision which can only be called "the worst decision of the decade," the court, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed as not clearly erroneous
the trial court's decision that SUN-MAID and SUNAID were not confusingly similar in Sun-Maid Raisin Growers v. Sunaid Food Products,
Inc." 3 The plaintiff was an agricultural cooperative and had continuously
used SUN-MAID since 1915, having registered the mark in 1917. Plaintiff
primarily packed and marketed raisins, its shipments of other food products being considered de minimus. Defendant Sunaid distributed a variety of fruit products, but raisins comprised a component of only one
product. The goods of both parties were sold to the same consumers, purchasers who frequented grocery stores. The court cited its decisions in
Minute Maid 14" for the proposition that the test of likelihood of confusion is whether the consumer would be likely to think defendant's products were produced by or had some connection with plaintiff, not whether
the labels could be distinguished 1 5 and in Frostie Co. v. Dr. Pepper Co.",
for the proposition that a mere ocular examination of the two marks
might permit a trial court to make its conclusion.11 7 However, the court
concluded that no likelihood of confusion existed as to the labels, thus
ignoring the well-settled principle that confusion may result from the

111. 362 F.2d at 377. As stated in Baker v. The Master Printers Union, 34 F. Supp. 808,
811 (D.N.J. 1940), "It has been well said that the most successful form of copying is to
employ enough points of similarity to confuse the public with enough points of difference to
confuse the courts."
112. "We do not rest our conclusion that the marks are confusingly similar solely on the
intention of United Bankers, however." 362 F.2d at 378.
113. 356 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1966).
114. 214 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1954), discussed in text accompanying note 28 supra.
115. Id. at 469. Note that the Minute Maid decision also stands for the proposition that
a finding of infringement does not depend on direct competition. The various fruit products
in the Sun-Maid case were certainly more closely related than the frozen steaks and frozen
juice products in the Minute Maid case.
116. 341 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1965), discussed in text accompanying note 182 infra.
117. 356 F.2d at 469.
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sound, meaning or appearance of the mark.118 A one letter difference does
not vitiate infringement.'" There is no way to reconcile this case with
properly decided precedents.
B. Protection of Strong and Weak Marks Used On Related Goods
Throughout the 1960's a string of decisions gave encouragement to the
owners of strong marks, as well as secondary meaning marks, such as
BUDWEISER, BEEFEATER, CHEVROLET, and PLAYBOY, nationally known by their ubiquitous presence and/or extensive advertising.
In Chemical Corp. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,120 the court affirmed a decree enjoining Chemical Corp. from using the slogan WHERE THERE'S
LIFE .

.

. THERE'S BUGS in conjunction with its combination floor

wax and insecticide, because such use constituted unfair competition with
Anheuser-Busch's beer slogan WHERE THERE'S LIFE ... THERE'S
BUD.' Because the products were in obviously distinct markets, the gravamen of the tort of unfair competition under Florida law was considered
to be the unwholesome association of ideas between bugs and a food
product. However, since the Dandee bread case' 22 had also been decided
118. 'The authorities are legion in holding that proof of actual deception is not
needed to justify an injunction against the use of a trademark if it is of such a
character or used in such a way as to be likely to deceive a prospective purchaser,
and that similarity of sound as well as appearance may be taken into account in
weighing this probability.' citing, LaTouraine Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee Co., 2
Cir., 157 F.2d 115; George W. Luft Co. v. Zande Cosmetic Co., 2 Cir., 142 F.2d
536; Esso, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 8 Cir., 98 F.2d 1; Queen ManufacturingCo. v.
Isaac Ginsberg & Bros. 8 Cir., 25 F.2d 284; S.S. Kresge Co. v. Champion Spark
Plug Co., 6 Cir., 3 F.2d 415; Coca-Cola Co. v. Old Dominion Beverage Corp., 4 Cir.
271 F. 600.
356 F.2d at 366, quoting Abramson v. Coro, Inc., 240 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1957). See also
Drop Dead Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 326 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1963) (PROMISE infringed PLEDGE for aerosol wax products because of same meaning); Hancock v. American
Steel & Wire Co., 203 F.2d 737 (C.C.P.A. 1953) (TORNADO substantially identical to CYCLONE for wire mesh fencing).
119. Cf. Garcia v. Montecrispi Cigar Co., 409 F.2d 14 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam)
(MONTECRISPI for cigars, registered in 1964, infringed MONTE CRISTO for cigars, registered in 1936. Defendant's registration was cancelled).
120. 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1963).
121. The decision accords with later determinations made by the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals involving slogans. In Cosmetically Yours, Inc. v. Clairol, Inc., 424 F.2d 1385
(C.C.P.A. 1970), the court determined that LOOK ALIVE for lipstick was confusingly similar to COME ALIVE for hair tint. In Roux Laboratories, Inc. v. Clairol, Inc., 427 F.2d 823
(C.C.P.A. 1970), the court said that HAIR COLOR SO NATURAL ONLY HER HAIRDRESSER KNOWS FOR SURE was not so highly descriptive or generic for hair coloring
preparation that it is incapable of functioning as a trademark.
122. Webb's City, Inc. v. Bell Bakeries, Inc., 226 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1955). See note 32
supra and accompanying text.
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under Florida law and Judges Brown and Tuttle were members of the
panels in both cases, the Dandee case had to be distinguished to grant
relief in this case. Chief Judge Tuttle did so unsatisfactorily by claiming
that the plaintiff in the earlier case had attempted to preempt absolutely
any other user from using its trademark DANDY or a colorable imitation
thereof.123 The plaintiff in that case simply had tried to prevent the use
of the phonetic equivalent of its mark, the first four letters of which were
the same, on the same product, in the same city. The court was simply
wrong in Dandee, and it should have taken this opportunity to admit it's
error, as Judge Brown did later.'" Chemical Corp. v. Anheuser-Busch
must be viewed as overruling, sub silentio, the Dandee decision.
Rarely does a plaintiff successfully move for summary judgment in this
field of law, being as fact-dependent as it is, but the motion was granted
and then affirmed by the Fifth Circuit in Beef/Eater Restaurants,Inc. v.
James Burrough, Ltd.1 $8 The plaintiffs-appellees were the maker and
United States distributor of world-renown BEEFEATER gin, and the
marks, the word mark and the red Tower of London guard symbol, had
been registered in the United States. Because people who drink also eat,
the trial court was not precluded from finding a likelihood that the public
would be misled to believe that some form of ownership, sponsorship, approval, or affiliation existed between plaintiffs and defendant since defendant not only used the name BEEF/EATER but also used on its menus a
picture of a guard symbol very similar to plaintiffs' symbols.I 6 It is interesting that the restaurant did not sell alcoholic beverages. District Judge
Hooper, writing for Chief Judge Brown and Judge Bell, responding to appellant's contention that the trial judge had heard no evidence, stated,
himself determine,
"the trial judge, by inspection of the trademarks, may
'127
and must determine, the likelihood of confusion.

For the sake of completeness we note in passing that the court af123. 306 F.2d at 437.
124. See Exxon, Inc. v. Texas Motor Exchange of Houston, Inc., 628 F.2d 500 (5th Cir.
1980) (Brown, J., dissenting), discussed in text accompanying note 391 infra.
125. 398 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1968), affirming the district court's awarding of summary
judgment for plaintiff, 272 F. Supp. 489 (N.D. Ga. 1967). Summary judgment was also
awarded in James Burrough Ltd. v. Lesher, 309 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D. Ind. 1969) (defendant
doing business as "Beefeaters" and "Beef Eaters" restaurants). See James Burrough Ltd. v.
La Joie, 462 F.2d 570 (C.C.P.A. 1972), in which the court reversed the T.T.A.B.'s decision to
dismiss opposition to registration to SIGN OF THE BEEFEATER for restaurant services;
James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1976), in which
the court reversed as "clearly erroneous" the lower court's directed verdict for defendant on
the basis of no likelihood of confusion. See also James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, 572 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1978).
126. 398 F.2d at 639.
127. Id.
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firmed, with a slight modification, a district court injunction prohibiting a
used car dealer, unaffiliated with General Motors Corporation, from using
CHEVROLET in his trade name."2 8
It is well settled law that a determination that a mark has acquired a
secondary meaning increases the scope of protection afforded an otherwise descriptive or geographically descriptive trademark.1 29 In a very significant decision in which the Fifth Circuit effectively overruled a rigid,
categorical rule1 80 and continued to exemplify protectionist tendencies,
the court held that a geographical term, by acquiring a secondary meaning, could merit protection against infringement. In Continental Motors
Corp. v. Continental Aviation Corp.,181 Judge Brown said for the court:
Regardless of whether a word or words adopted and used as a trademark
or trade name could be characterized as geographical in nature, where
such words have acquired a "secondary meaning," the courts will afford
equitable protection to the party whose use of the word has created the
secondary meaning.8'
The court did not decide the question of secondary meaning in this
case, but reversed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint and remanded for a hearing on the merits of the issues of secondary meaning
and likelihood of confusion. The court noted, however, that plaintiff was
the world's largest manufacturer of internal combustion engines, approximately twenty-five per cent of which were used in aircraft, and had
twenty trademarks registered using the terms CONTINENTAL and
CONTINENTAL AVIATION. Continental Aviation Corporation was a
service shop which overhauled and repaired aircraft engines, instruments,
and accessories, but did not sell aircraft engines.
The court did not expressly overrule the earlier Continental88 case relied on by defendant but explained its decision not to follow precedent
with the language: "Time, tide, and the relentless movement of the
copywriter's pen makes what we once said no longer controlling, not so

128. Trail Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 381 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1967) (per
curiam).
129. See generally 1 J. McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPIrTION § 15 (1973).
See also Lunsford, The Mechanics of Proof of Secondary Meaning, 60 TRADEMARK REP. 263
(1970); Lunsford, Proof of Secondary Meaning, APLA Patent & Trademark Litigation Institute Al, paper given at La Costa, Cal. (1978).
130. In Continental Ins. Co. v. Continental Fire Ass'n, 101 F. 255 (5th Cir. 1900), the
court held that CONTINENTAL could not be exclusively appropriated as a trademark or
trade name.
131. 375 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1967).
132. Id. at 861.
133. 101 F. 255 (5th Cir. 1900). See note 130 supra.

1188

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

much from change in the law, but from change in economic fact.""" Nevertheless, the Lanham Act did broaden the scope of protection available
under prior law by eliminating from the infringement section the requirement that the infringing mark be used on "goods of substantially the
same descriptive properties."' 5
During the same year that the court decided the Continental case, it
also affirmed a district court injunction against the unauthorized use of
PLAYBOY family of trademarks in Turner v. HMH Publishing Co.'8 6
Turner was doing business as Atlanta's Playboy Club without benefit of
any connection or association with the Hugh Hefner publishing and entertainment empire. Turner used the PLAYBOY, PLAYBOY CLUB, and
PLAYMATE marks made famous by plaintiff's efforts in promoting the
marks. The courts determined that the marks had acquired a secondary
meaning, even in the face of defendant's efforts to prove that third party
uses had made the marks weak and diluted. Judge Ainsworth expressed
his opinion of third-party registrations in a notable footnote:
Defendants submitted a number of exhibits of copies of third-party registrations of trademarks of the name "Playboy" in aid of their argument
that the mark "Playboy" was weak and diluted by wide usage by the
public. However, defendants do not contend that their use of the term
was prior to that of plaintiffs. We will not assume any knowledge on the
part of the purchasing public by mere registrations in the Patent Office,
nor will we assume that the marks are in continuing use, so as to have
any effect on the mind of the purchasing public merely because they had
been so registered. See J.C. Hall Company v. Hallmark Cards, Incorporated, C.C.P.A., 1965, 340 F.2d 960; Application of Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. 1962, 305 F.2d 492, 49 CCPA 1367.""
Turner's additional defense that HMH had abandoned its marks because it did not operate the Playboy nightclubs but relied on uncontrolled
licensees"" was countered with evidence of control and supervision of all
of HMH's clubs. The Lanham Act allows for the use of marks by "related
companies,"" ' and "such use shall not affect the validity of such mark or
134. 375 F.2d at 862.
135. Trademark Act of 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724, 728 (1905).
136. 380 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1967).
137. Id. at 228 n.2. For another PLAYBOY case which disposes of third-party uses of
the same or similar mark as a defense, see Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (defendant preliminarily enjoined from publishing PLAYMEN magazine).
138. In Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962), discussed in text accompanying note 180 infra, the court had said that a licensor may lose
control by not taking appropriate action, and allowing misuse of its mark by others could
work a constructive abandonment.
139. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976) defines related company to mean "any person who legiti-
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of its registration. ' "4
An earlier decision of the court held that a mark descriptive of the
product was entitled to protection if it had acquired a secondary meaning. In Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Sta-Brite Fluorescent Manufacturing
Co.,"," Judge Rives, reversing the trial court's judgment for defendant,
said, "The mark [DAY-BRITE] having acquired a secondary meaning, it
will be protected irrespective of any original weakness [descriptiveness]."" 2 The case was remanded for a determinatioh of whether STABRITE infringed DAY-BRITE.
All of the issues presented in the cases discussed in this section were
correctly decided and enhanced the court's reputation as a protectionist
court, a label of which the judges could be justifiably proud.
C.

TerritorialRights

Registration on the principle register 1" under the Lanham Act constitutes constructive notice 1" of the registrant's claim of ownership of the
mark. Yet the courts have not literally and liberally construed the statute. It has been held that a federal registrant is entitled to use his trademark or service mark throughout the country and is entitled to protection against infringement by any subsequent user, but may not preclude
the use of his mark, even by a late-comer, in an area where he cannot
demonstrate likelihood of confusion. Such is the teaching of the two significant geographic rights cases decided in the 1960's, American Foods,
Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc.141 and John R. Thompson Co. v. Holloway.1 4 6
Both were based on the landmark Second Circuit decision in Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc.,14 7 which held that the federal registrant-plaintiff could not preclude the defendant's use of the mark DAWN
DONUT in a six-county area of New York because the plaintiff had not
marketed its product in that area for thirty years, thus precluding any
likelihood of confusion. If plaintiff did expand into defendant's territory
in the future, then plaintiff would be able to enjoin defendant's use bemately controls or is controlled by the registrant or applicant for registration in respect to
the nature and quality of the goods or services in connection with which the mark is used."
140. 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (1976).
141. 308 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1962).
142. Id. at 382.
143. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1976).
144. 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1976) provides, in pertinent part: "Registration of a mark on the
principal register . . . shall be constructive notice of the registrant's claim of ownership
thereof."
145. 312 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1963).
146. 366 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1966).
147. 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
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cause of its prior use and the constructive notice provision of the Lanham
Act, which eliminates any unknowing, good-faith defense." 's
In the Golden Flake case,1 49 Golden Flake, Inc. sued for infringement
of its registered mark GOLDEN FLAKE, used on its potato chips and
other snacks. The infringement resulted from defendant's use of the mark
on refrigerated dinner rolls which were sold through the same outlets to
the same class of purchasers and were advertised in similar media. The
trial court enjoined defendant's use only in Golden Flake's actual trade
area, all or part of six southern states, because no evidence of expansion
outside that area was introduced. No likelihood of confusion existed
outside plaintiff's trade area. Affirming the district court's order, Judge
Bell held, "Under it [Dawn Donut] and in our opinion, the protection of
the [Lanham] Act runs only to those areas where the trade-mark has gone
on the goods through sale or advertisement, together with such additional
1 50
areas as are warranted under the evidence for expansion.'
In Holloway,'5 ' John R. Thompson Co. owned two registrations for
HOLLOWAY HOUSE for frozen foods and one service mark registration
for the same mark for restaurant services. Plaintiff, prior to defendant's
use, used this mark on eleven cafeterias in the eastern United States, but
not in Texas, although it did sell frozen food in Texas. Defendant operated a restaurant, not a cafeteria, under the family name "Holloway" in
Ft. Worth, Texas. Affirming the district court's finding of no likelihood of
confusion based on the sale of frozen food in Texas and the district
court's denial of injunctive relief, Judge Rives held, "A registrant's remedies are thus limited, and it has no presently enforceable rights to an
area to which there is no presently provable probability of such expansion
of the registrant's services or reputation as will create a likelihood of confusion."' Judge Rives went on to state, however, that because of the
Lanham's Act constructive notice provision, 53 "if future expansion of the
plaintiff's business or reputation does occur and confusion becomes likely,
the rights of the plaintiff are definitely superior to those of the
defendants."''

148. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5) (1976) provides for a good faith defense for use prior to the
registrant's date of registration. See, e.g., Mister Donut of America, Inc. v. Mr. Donut, Inc.,
418 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1969). This defense applies only to the geographical area in which
such continuous prior use is proved. This section should not be confused with 15 U.S.C. §
1115(b)(4) (1976), which provides a defense for the good faith use of a mark only to describe
the goods or services.
149. 312 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1963).
150. Id. at 626.
151. 366 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1966).
152. Id. at 114 (emphasis in original).
153. 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1976).
154. 366 F.2d at 116.
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In consonance with Golden Flake and Holloway, the court, in a per
curiam opinion, also affirmed an injunction against the use of the name
"TraveLodge", plaintiff's registered service mark, or any name similar
thereto, despite the defendant's claim of first use in Alabama for motel
services. 5"
These territorial rights cases can be explained by the fact that no likelihood of confusion can exist if the senior user-registrant's mark is not
known in the junior user's territory. Since "known" encompasses actual
use, reputation, and advertising with its pervasive coverage, the prototypical situation should be increasingly rarer as time goes on. However, for
the intent of the Lanham Act to be carried out, jurists must have the
fortitude to enjoin the junior user's infringing use if the senior user expands into the junior user's local territory, despite the recurring "equitable" defense that the junior user has built up substantial good will in his
territory. Searches of the records of the Patent and Trademark Office are
not expensive compared to the other costs of doing business. No reason
exists to allow a junior user to infringe a senior user's mark just because
he did not take the time to verify that a particular name or mark was
available for use. This is the clear import of the Lanham Act's constructive notice provision."" Two of the leading trademark commentators have
stated that the junior user "is living on borrowed time 1'

7
1

and that the

"failure to search, whether through ignorance, carelessness or design,
amounts to trademark Russian roulette."'" If the courts show an unwillingness to enjoin junior infringers after expansion by the senior user into
the junior user's territory, the only alternative is to adopt a rule allowing
absolute preemption of the right to use a mark by the registrant, unless
the goods are so unrelated that no confusion could conceivably result
from the junior's use. 159
D. Jurisdiction
The Anheuser-Busch case'" presented an interesting jurisdictional
question: Whether the provisions of the Lanham Act may be invoked on
155. Siragusa v. The Travelodge Corp., 352 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1965), aff'g 228 F. Supp.
238 (N.D. Ala. 1964).
156. 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1976). Cf. however, e.g., Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry
Corp., 580 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979), in which that court
affirmed per curiam the denial of an injunction against the junior user even though the trial
court had made an affirmative finding of likelihood of confusion!
157. 12 J. McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPErITION § 26.13 (1973).
158. 1 J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 4.02 (1979).
159. See note 17 supra, and accompanying text. See also Lunsford, GeographicalScope
of Registered Rights - Then and Now, 61 TRADEMARK RE. 411, 419-20 (1971).
160. 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1962). See note 120 supra, and accompanying text.
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the basis of a pending application. At the time Anheuser-Busch filed suit,
it had an application pending to register WHERE THERE'S LIFE...
THERE'S BUD as a trademark. Since the district court had issued a
temporary restraining order,"" no actual infringement occurred between
the filing of the suit and the trial on the merits. 1s6 Plaintiffs registration
issued approximately one month before the trial began, and plaintiff
"amended" ' s its complaint to include a cause of action based on violation
of the Lanham Act. The trial court denied the federal claim, basing liability on Florida common law and jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship.
Cbief Judge Tuttle, writing for Judges Brown and Bell, considered this
point at Anheuser-Busch's urging and said:
We think that, the suit having been amended to allege the registration
under the Lanham Act, the complaint alleged sufficient threats and intentions on the part of the defendant to violate the very terms of the
Lanham Act so as to constitute an allegation of sufficient facts upon
which relief could have been granted by the trial court under the Act
alone. An equity court, in considering injunctive relief, views the case as
of the time of the granting of the relief."
The court, first, inadvisedly and unnecessarily addressed the jurisdictional issue, and, second, decided it incorrectly. Because the court affirmed permanent injunctive relief under Florida law based on diversity
of citizenship, it was unnecessary to consider the Lanham Act count, especially in view of the claim's uniqueness. 1 "5Once deciding to address the
issue, however, the court should have affirmed the trial court's denial of
jurisdiction. The Lanham Act prohibits "any reproduction, counterfeit,
copy or colorable imitation of a registered mark. . . ."I" The Lanham
Act does not provide for the relation back of the effective date of registration to the date of application. The registration occurred one month
before the trial began, and Judge Tuttle indicated that plaintiff had
"amended" its complaint. 1 '7The procedural device of amendment, even if
proper, could not grant a right not granted by the appropriate substantive law, the Lanham Act. Furthermore, amendment was improper in this
circumstance because the registration issued after the filing of the com161. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
162. 306 F.2d at 439.
163. FED. R. Civ. P. 15.
164. 306 F.2d at 439.
165. The authors have been unable to find any citation to this aspect of the case by any
court (including the Fifth Circuit) or to find a similar procedural situation arising in any
other case.
166. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
167. 306 F.2d at 439.
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plaint. Rule 15(a) 168 provides for amending pleadings to include facts and
allegations in existence, but unknown or overlooked, at the time of filing
the pleading. Rule 15(a)' 69 provides for supplemental pleadings concerning transactions or occurrences happening after the date of filing the
pleading. Rule 15(c)"70 concerns the relation back of amended, not supplemental, pleadings to the date of the original pleading. Hence, the effective date of the registration was the date of registration, one month
before the trial, and no infringing activity occurred then because of the
prohibition of the temporary restraining order. Thus, even if the relation
back provision of Rule 15(c) did apply to supplemental pleadings, no "use
in commerce" as required by Section 32(1)(a) of the Lanham Act 1 7 1 had
occurred.
For all of the foregoing reasons, and because Judge Tuttle cited no authority in his discussion of the issue of whether jurisdiction under the
Lanham Act can be based upon a pending application, the authors respectfully disagree with the court's conclusion that, "the threat of infringement could be the basis of an injunction [and that] it would not be
necessary for the plaintiff to wait until actual infringement had occurred
before bringing the action to enjoin."' 17 This criticism of a tangential is168.

FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides:
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at
any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which
no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the
trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served.
Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time
remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days after service of
the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
169. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(d) provides:
(d) Supplemental Pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. If the court
deems it advisable that the adverse party plead thereto, it shall so order, specifying the time therefor.
170. FED. R. Crv. P. 15(c) provides, in pertinent part:
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in
the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates
back to the date of the original pleading.
171. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1976).
172. 306 F.2d at 439. Judge Tuttle may have been thinking about a declaratory judgment procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201, 2202 (1976), which could declare the rights of the
parties to their respective marks, but would not equal a finding of liability under the Lanham Act. Cf. Raxton Corp. v. Anania Associates, Inc., 635 F.2d 924 (1980) (federal trade-
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sue in the case does not supersede the earlier17 3 conclusion that the court
reached the correct decision on the merits. Had plaintiff alleged a cause
of action under section 43(a), it may have advanced .by nine years the
recognition of that section
in the Fifth Circuit as providing an indepen74
dent cause of action.L

E. Trademarks and Antitrust Law
There has long been a debate between those who believe trademark
protection engenders some form of monopoly power which is antithetical
to the interests of the public and those who belive trademarks promote
competition and the free enterprise economy.'"7 Coming down decisively
on the side of the latter proposition, the Fifth Circuit stated resoundingly: "There is not now, nor has there ever been, a conflict between the
antitrust laws and trademark laws or the law of unfair competition."'" 6
mark registration takes effect when the Patent and Trademark Office issues a certificate of
registration); Coca-Cola Co. v. Busch, 44 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Pa. 1942) (not necessary to wait
until a product is manufactured and marketed to file for injunctive relief) (citing Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923) and Standard Oil Co. (N.Y.) v. Standard
Oil Co. (Maine), 38 F.2d 677 (D. Me. 1930)). The authors do not take issue with the wellestablished rule that injunctive relief may be granted when trademark infringement or unfair competition is merely threatened or iminent, nor do the authors disagree with the fact
that the courts have frequently granted injunctive relief in advance of the defendant actually conducting its business activities under the name. This is certainly true in the foregoing
cases and, generally, is also true when a defendant merely proposes to market a product
under an infringing mark and has taken steps to do so. See J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PRO'rECTION AND PRACTICE, § 8.07[2](1974). The authors' disagreement is confined to the court's
holding that the federal court had jurisdiction prior to the issuance of a Certificate of Registration simply because an application to register had been filed. The C.C.P.A. has held: "So
far as the office [Patent and Trademark] is concerned, passing a mark to publication is
tantamount to granting the registration" In re Beaunit Mills, Inc., 274 F.2d 436, 438
(C.C.P.A. 1960).
173. See note 120 supra, and accompanying text.
174. See Alum-A-Fold Shutter Corp. v. Folding Shutter Corp., 441 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.
1971), discussed in text accompanying note 283 infra, for the first explicit recognition of
section 43(a) as providing a cause of action independently from a related infringement
claim.
175. See, e.g., for the former proposition, Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren Ltd.,
137 F.2d 955 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758 (1943); cf. Lunsford, Trademarks and the
Antitrust Law: Complete Compatability - No Divorce Needed, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 463
(1975). See also Rogers, The Lanham Act and The Social Functionof Trademarks, 14 LAW
AND CoNTEmp. PROB. 173 (1949) and Pattishall, Trade-Marks and the Monopoly Phobia, 50
MICH. L. Rcv. 967 (1952).
176. Standard Oil Co. (Kentucky) v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 363 F.2d 945, 954 (5th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1007 (1967), cited approvingly by then Judge, now Mr.
Justice, Blackmun in Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. American Oil Co., 405 F.2d 803 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 905 (1969).
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In the Standard Oil case,177 the court held. that use by Humble Oil,
plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action, of the mark ESSO in a five
state area historically inhabited by Standard Oil of Kentucky (SOK)
would constitute unfair competition. The basis of the decision was that
ESSO sounded like S.O., the abbreviation for Standard Oil, despite the
fact that SOK had never used either ESSO or S.O. as a trademark.1 7 8 The
court believed that the public perceived S.O. as signifying SOK in its five
state region of Kentucky, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi.
The underlying theory supporting the court's decision is dependent
upon the anfractuous historical relationships among the various Standard
Oil companies. Briefly, when the Standard Oil Trust was dismembered'
in 1911, SOK assumed control of its allotted five state area and could
rightfully preclude any other use of the Standard Oil name in that area.
Prior to later antitrust difficulties with the government, SOK had marketed Humble's products under the ESSO mark on the basis of contract
agreements. This relationship helped implant in the public mind the erroneous perception that all Standard Oil, S.O., ESSO, SOHIO, etc., companies were related. This relationship provided the primary reason that the
court determined that Humble, by using the ESSO mark, would unfairly
benefit from SOK's goodwill in SOK's five state area. The public would
not perceive any difference between a Standard Oil station and an ESSO
station, believing them to be commonly owned. Based on this factual
background, it seems clear that Judge Rives properly reversed the district
court's decision in favor of Humble as being clearly erroneous, because
likelihood of confusion was great.
In Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 180 the court held that
limiting the trade territories of trademark licensees was not offensive to
the antitrust laws since the licensees were a group of small mattress manufacturers which had banded together to compete against large national
manufacturers. The association held the rights to the trademark that was
then licensed to the members of the association, each of which made mattresses in accordance with standard specifications.
The protection of trademarks does not promote a monopoly of or in
anything except the right to use a word or symbol to denote a product.
The trademark is seen by some as monopolistic only because of the great
value of some marks, great value created by the hard work of the owner
of the mark and his investment of time and money. There is no monopoly
in the product. Anyone can compete with the product so long as he does
not use a trademark confusingly similar to the one already successfully
177.
178.
179.
180.

363 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1966).
Accord, Esso, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), 98 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1938).
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962).

1196

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

established by the senior user. Why should the imitator be unjustly enriched? The only legitimate claim of "monopoly" a critic of the trademark system could have is if a trademark owner were allowed to preclude
others from using the generic name of the product, i.e., the competitors
were left without a common name by which to call the product. This the
trademark law does not allow.181
F.

"Descriptive" Use of Another's Trademark

In Frostie Co. v. Dr. Pepper Co.,"' 2 the court reversed a verdict for defendant and remanded for a determination of whether "Frosty Pepper"
was likely to cause confusion with FROSTIE rootbeer. Dr. Pepper had
used "Frosty Pepper" on its cartons of DR. PEPPER soft drinks, which
also displayed a picture of a glass of ice cream immersed in DR. PEPPER. In ordering the remand, the court instructed the district court "not
[to] assume that the ordinary purchaser is thoroughly familiar with the
products of the two parties."1 8 The outcome of the remand may have
been predetermined because Chief Judge Tuttle, writing for Judges
Brown and Gewin, said: "Since such use of it incorporates the entire
trademark of the appellant and can not be excused as being descriptive of
the appellee's product, then it is, almost by definition, the equivalent of
an infringing mark."'
Not surprisingly, the district court found a likelihood of confusion to support determinations of trademark infringement
Oand unfair competion, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.185 The teaching of
the Frostie cases is that one must not use another's mark to modify or
describe his own product's name.
The court correctly protected the FROSTIE trademark because there
181. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (1976) prohibits registration of a mark which is "merely descriptive," i.e., generic. King-Seely Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d
Cir. 1963) affirmed a decision that "thermos" had become the generic name for vacuum
bottles and was no longer a trademark. Dupont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co., 85
F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936), similarly declared "cellophane" to be generic.
182. 341 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1965).
183. Id. at 367.
184. Id. FROSTY is the phonetic equivalent of FROSTIE; see note 120, supra.
185. 361 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1966). Accord, Frostie Co. v. Sun-Glo Packers, Inc., 315 F.2d
932 (C.C.P.A. 1963), in which the court reversed the dismissal of an opposition proceeding
against the registration of FROSTY INN for a soft drink. "We are in full agreement with
the board (Trademark Trial and Appeal Board] that neither "Frosty" nor "Frostie" describes any property of root beer or other soft drinks. Thus they are not descriptive." Id. at
933. The court felt that the use of FROSTY INN was likely to deceive purchasers. An interesting sidelight on the FROSTIE story is that previously Dr. Pepper Co. had used the name
"Frosty Pep" and was sued by Pepsi-Cola. Pepsi-Cola Co. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 214 F. Supp.
377 (W.D. Pa. 1963) (motion for change of venue-evidently the case was settled because
there are no subsequent decisions reported).
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was no need or excuse for Dr. Pepper to use the term "Frosty." Some
substitute could have been used, e.g., "Frigid Pepper," "Chilly Pepper" or
"Pepper Cow" (spinning off from the familiar black cow name associated
with rootbeer and ice cream).
G.

Nonfunctional Design Features

The design or appearance of a building can function as a mark if it is
used to identify and distinguish the goods and services of the owner.1"
187
The Fifth Circuit faced this problem in McDonald's Corp. v. Moore,
when McDonald's appealed from a district court decision holding that de-

fendant's building design did not infringe McDonald's GOLDEN
ARCHES. Relief was granted, however, for unfair competition (the copying of a McDonald's operational manual) and breach of contract. Despite

the facts that defendant's drive-in restaurants were painted yellow and
had twenty-one "loops" attached around the outside of the building, that
defendant's architect had formerly worked as a resident architect for McDonald's, and that defendant's signs also had "loops" on them, the trial
court determined that McDonald's arches had a parabolic shape while defendant's did not. The Fifth Circuit panel of Judges Brown and Coleman
and district Judge Dawkins, in a per curiam opinion, held, "The decision
of factual issues is for the trial court. The findings below are supported
by substantial evidence which the trier of the fact had a right to accept.
We must affirm.""
If the 1950's could be classified as a decade in which the court found its
way through the vagaries of the new Lanham Act, hitting here and missing there, then the 1960's may be classified as a decade in which the court
matured and gave the Act the liberal construction intended by Con-

186. 1 J. McCARTHY, TRADMARKS AND UNFAm CoMPETrrmoN § 7:34A (1973). See, e.g.,
White Tower Sys., Inc. v. White Castle Sys. of Eating House Corp., 90 F.2d 67 (6th Cir.
1937).
187. 363 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1966).
188. Id. at 436 (emphasis added). See, for other building design cases, Fotomat Corp. v.
Ace Corp., 208 U.S.P.Q. 92 (S.D. Cal. 1980) (copying of distinctive portions of Fotomat's
kiosk sufficient to support injunctive relief); Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp. 1231
(D. Kan. 1977) (relief granted-infringement of plaintiff's kiosk design); Fotomat Corp. v.
Photo Drive Thru, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 693 (D.N.J. 1977) (no infringement of plaintiff's kiosk
design). For generally related subject matter, see also Truck Equipment Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976) (copying of nonfunctional exterior design of twin
hopper bottomed bulk commodity semi-trailer and use of photos of plaintiff's vehicle in
defendant's advertising campaign constituted violations of section 43(a) of Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976)), and In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967)
(commercial success of wine bottles not promoted as a trademark does not establish secondary meaning-registration denied).
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gress. 181 The Lanham Act set forth the standard of likelihood of confusion, 109 not the mere possibility of confusion, a standard which should be
liberally and flexibly applied to promote the intent of the Act. Any substantial evidence, not uncontroverted proof, of such likelihood should
weigh heavily in a court's consideration of the facts. In most cases there is
some evidence of intent on the part of the defendant to benefit from the
famous mark of the plaintiff. In such circumstances the defendant should
not be given an equitable leg to stand on and should be enjoined. Let
him, and make him, succeed on his own merit."'
IV.

1970-1980: THE GOLDEN YEARS

(CONTINUED) WITH HINTS OF

DECLINE

Trademark jurisprudence, however, has long recognized that the lack of
competitiveness is not always dispositive of the question of confusion
and hence infringement. One such relationship where this is true exists
when the sponsor or maker of one business or product might naturally be
assumed to be the maker or sponsor of another business or product. The
confusion evident in such cases is confusion of the business; the deceived
customer buys the infringer's product in the belief that it originates with
the trademark owner or that it in some way is affiliated with the owner.
When this occurs, the infringer is unjustly trading on the owner's established reputation. This is the precise wrong trademark legislation seeks
to prevent. 19'
In this case, we fly by magic carpet through the exotic and esoteric realm
of trademark law and the Lanham Act. 1"
The two quotes above, the first from World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrel's New World Carpets'" in 1971, and the second from Armstrong
Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc."95 in 1979, reflect the reversal of,attitude
which occurred in the Fifth Circuit during the 1970's. World Carpets I
represents a reasoned doctrinal approach to applying established princi189. See Goldberg and Borchard, Related Goods Trademark Cases In The Second Circuit, 70 TRADEMARK REP. 287, 294 (1980), in which the authors quote the Senate Committee
Report concerning the Lanham Act as stating that the purpose underlying the Act was to
protect the public and to protect the trademark owners from pirates and cheats.
190. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(d), 1114(1) (1976).
191. See note 92 supra, and accompanying text.
192. World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell's New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 488 (5th
Cir. 1971).
193. Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 932 (1979).
194. 438 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1971) (hereinafter referred to as World Carpets I).
195. 597 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 932 (1979) (hereinafter referred
to as World Carpets II).

1981]

TRADEMARK PROTECTION

1199

pies of trademark law to a given fact situation. World Carpets If represents an attitude which demonstrates disrespect for this field and indicates the judges' feelings of a lack of substantive challenge. 1 " The
Lanham Act rather clearly reflects Congress' positive and affirmative position on trademark law, and there are many fine decisions, in the Fifth
Circuit and the other circuits, which interpret and apply the Act correctly. There are also a number of bad decisions, in the Fifth Circuit and
the other circuits, which have been decided incorrectly because the judges
either did not understand the policies underlying trademark law or had
preconceived ideas as to the outcome.
Generally the early and mid-1970's reflected a continuation of the
golden years of the 1960's. The court continued to interpret the Lanham
Act as Congress intended, liberally and rightly protective of the rights of
trademark owners. The court also adopted the rule of other circuits that
section 43(a) 1'9 created an independent cause of action and a trademark
registration was not a prerequisite to gaining the additional protection
provided by that section. The late Walter J. Derenberg said that the 1975
case of Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O'Neal' s "continues a growing line of enlightened decisions in the Fifth Circuit."' 9' Boston Professional Hockey
Association v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Co. 2 00 and Kentucky Fried Chicken
Corp. v.Diversified Packing Corp.2 0 ' are among the best opinions of the
decade. On the other hand Holiday Inn, Inc. v. Holiday Out In
America"' was irrational and unfounded in logic, reason or justice. Although the portentousness of that decision was unknown at the time because it could be viewed as merely aberrational, it foreshadowed a development late in the decade that stood the doctrine of stare decisis on its
head.
Late in the decade three panels of the court proved the advisability of
creating the new Eleventh Circuit by showing beyond a doubt that the
Fifth Circuit had grown so large that different panels could no longer fol-

196. In addition to Chief Judge Brown's opening line quoted in text accompanying note
193 supra, his headings include: "In The Beginning/The Carpetbaggers," "The Rug Beaters," "How It Went: A Rug By Any Other Name," "The Legal Standard: Confusion Reigns,"
and "The Standard Applied: Who's Confused? By What?" See also notes 11 and 12 supra,
and accompanying text.
197. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976).
198. 513 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1975), discussed in text accompanying note 226 infra.
199. Derenberg, The Twenty-Ninth Year.. ., 66 TRADEMARK REP. 337, 396 (1976).
200. 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1976) (hereinafter referred
to as Hockey Emblem), discussed in text accompanying note 270 infra.
201. 549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977) (hereinafter referred to as Kentucky Fried Chicken),
discussed in text accompanying note 253 infra.
202. 481 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1973) (hereinafter referred to as Holiday Inn), discussed in
text accompanying note 244 infra.
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low its own precedents. In the decisions of these panels, discussed in Part
V, the Fifth Circuit showed that it had abandoned nearly thirty years of
generally well-reasoned opinions properly construing the Lanham Act and
applying the laws of unfair competition. These decisions do not promote
the interests of the public or trademark owners because they invite the
pirates and cheats' to imitate or closely simulate established marks
which can only lead to greater consumer confusion in the marketplace.
These decisions also place trademark counsel in a quandry when trying to
advise clients regarding proposed new marks.
Previously, the rule was clear: Colorable imitations (liberally construed)
would be enjoined. The court's "new rule" can lead only to expensive litigiousness which can benefit only two groups: infringers and lawyers.
The cost is too great and the benefits are nil. The Fifth Circuit must
return to, and we hope the new Eleventh Circuit will commence upon, the
path of reasoned application of the intent of the Lanham Act and of adherence to well-established precedent.
A.

When Is a Similar Name for the Same Goods or Services Confusing?

During the 1970's, the Fifth Circuit heard two more cases in the litigious history of Aloe Creme Laboratories.' 0 4 In 1970 the court held, and
rightly so, that the evidentiary burden to prove secondary meaning is
great when the mark primarily designates a principal ingredient of the
product (ALO designating the main active ingredient taken from the aloe
vera plant) . 0 Both parties marketed families of ALO-products. Plaintiffappellant's marks were registered, but only on the supplemental register,'" ' and plaintiff had disclaimed any rights in ALO used by itself. The
court affirmed the trial court's findings that plaintiff's marks were descriptive and without secondary meaning. Obviously, no relief was
granted. In the second case ALO was not at issue, but the court affirmed
the trial court's determination that APRES SUN was not likely to cause
confusion with the registered mark AFTER TAN when both were used on
after sun lotions. The court also affirmed the lower court's finding that
AFTER TAN merely described the goods. Thus, plaintiff's registrations
203. See note 189 supra.
204. See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
205. Aloe Cremne Labs, Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., 423 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1970). See also Aloe
Corp. v. Aloe Creme Labs, Inc., 420 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1970) (reversing finding of trial court
that ALO had acquired a secondary meaning). Cf. Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc. v. Aloe 99,
Inc., 485 F.2d 1241 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (reversing judgment of Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board against opposition to registration of ALOE 99, remanded for development of factual
issues of secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion).
206. See 15 U.S.C. § 1091 (1976).
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were invalid. °7
In World Carpets 1,208 Judges Clark, Gewin, and Jones comprised a
panel which affirmed the district court's determination that WORLD and
WORLD plus a geographic globe design constituted registrable marks
under section 2(e) of the Lanham Act,' 0 ' which prohibits registration of
"primarily geographically descriptive" marks, and that defendant's use of
the mark NEW WORLD CARPETS plus a globe design (with latitudinal
and longitudinal lines only) infringed plaintiff's marks. In discussing the
registrability of WORLD for carpets, the court reasoned:
[I]t has been noted that a mark is not primarily geographically descriptive if (1) it does not identify the place of the region from which the
goods come, or (2) it does not suggest that the goods come from the place
or region named by the mark .... The term "Allstate", while conceiva-

bly a geographical reference, lacks sufficient specificity to identify it with
any particular geographical unit and therefore enrollment is allowed.
Such a word is of a similar cast to "National" and "International" which
*

.

.are nationwide or worldwide in scope, and therefore are not really

'0
geographical terms at all." "1

Undoubtedly, unrefuted evidence of actual confusion persuaded the
courts to enjoin the infringer's use. The court explicitly recognized,211however, that the test is likelihood of confusion, not actual confusion.
Despite acknowledging in a backhanded way that the law of unfair
competition had some substance, by stating that "unfair competition is
an amorphous but not an altogether vaporous area of the law,"1'' 1 Judge

Goldberg did render a correct opinion in B.H. Bunn Co. v. AAA Replacement Parts Co.2 13 In that case, the appellee, AAA and/or its predecessor,

had been sales and service representatives, handling appellant's knot-tying machines for securing package and bundles for thirteen years. Then
AAA started making its own replacement parts for Bunn's machines.
While the court found that AAA's use of the symbol "&" did not infringe
Bunn's "knot design' trademark, it did find that, under Florida common
law, AAA competed unfairly with Bunn by literally copying Bunn's price
list, including the part numbers, in order to advertise and identify its own
replacement parts. Because of the prior business relationship between the
207. Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc. v. Estee Lauder, Inc., 533 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1976)
(per curiam).
208. 438 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1971).
209. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (1976).
210. 438 F.2d at 486 (footnotes omitted).
211. "While this circuit regards the question of confusion as a fact determination, it is
not necessary to show actual confusion." Id. at 489 (citation is omitted).
212. B.H. Bunn Co. v. AAA Replacement Parts Co., 451 F.2d 1254, 1258 (5th Cir. 1971).
213. Id.
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parties, using a copy of Bunn's price list made it doubly likely that purchasers would believe they were getting genuine Bunn replacement parts
instead of AAA's reverse-engineered copies, thus subjecting Bunn's reputation to disrepute based on AAA's acts. However, the court modified the
sweeping prohibition of the district court's injunction to allow AAA to
state, for example, that a particular part would "fit or replace Bunn part
no. XXX."' "
In a decision which can only be called amazing, the court, in a per
curiam opinion, affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction sought by
Holeinone, Inc. to prohibit the use of INTERNATIONAL HOLE-INONE CLUB in sponsoring golf matches, vacations, and related services.2 5
Plaintiff used the registered service mark HOLE-IN-ONE CLUB, and defendant demonstrated its intent to deceive by soliciting accommodations
from and offering vacations to many of the same golf clubs advertised by
plaintiff. The district court held that the mark was descriptive and had
acquired no secondary meaning,"' and that plaintiff had failed to show
irreparable harm. Affirming because there was no clear abuse of discretion, the Fifth Circuit seemed to overlook the elementary logic of the situation. While a hole-in-one is descriptive of a rare occurrence in the game
of golf, it is certainly no less than suggestive of golf-related services such
as sponsoring matches and vacations.2 ' In the latter context, the mark
was entitled to greater protection than that afforded by the courts, especially when the junior user was in exactly the same field of business. The
court's decision conflicts directly with the rationale of Fifth Circuit precedents, including Abramson v. Coro, Inc.,1"' Pure Foods, Inc. v. Minute
Maid Corp.,"'9 and Frostie Co. v. Dr. Pepper Co. 2 0 Moreover, the district
court admitted, "The Court is not unaware that the defendant's choice of
an organization name so similar to that of the plaintiff was deliberate and
undoubtedly made with the expectation of a ride on the coat-tails of a
successful venture."22 1 The Blue Shield2 2 decision addressed this point
directly. As for the district court's finding that plaintiff was not irreparably harmed, the authorities are legion that one's unauthorized use of an214. Id. at 1269.
215. Holeinone, Inc. v. International Hole-In-One Club, Inc., 466 F.2d 504 (5th Cir.
1972).
216. A federal registrant is not required to show secondary meaning. Roto-Rooter Corp.
v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 46 (5th Cir. 1975).
217. See also Augusta Natl Inc. v. The Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 193 U.S.P.Q.
210 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (MASTERS versus LADIES' MASTERS for golf tournaments).
218. 240 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1957).
219. 214 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1954).
220. 341 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1965).
221. 341 F. Supp. 1241, 1243 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
222. 362 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1966). See note 110 supra, and accompanying text.
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other's mark inherently constitutes irreparable harm.2 ' s

The Holeinone case graphically demonstrates that, because the Supreme Court consistently refuses to consider cases brought under the
Lanham Act,124 the circuit courts of appeals must exercise greater perspi-

cacity and circumspection in dealing with trademark cases. This will be
necessary to build a consistent doctrinal base upon which legal counsel,
and, more importantly, users of trademarks can rely to predict the consequences of a contemplated course of action.
In the decision which continued "a growing line of enlightened decisions in the Fifth Circuit,' ' 2 the court reversed the district court on a
point of law in Rota-Rooter Corp. v. O'Neal." Finding that O'Neal's use

of the service mark ROTARY DE-ROOTING did not infringe plaintiff's
famous ROTO-ROOTER mark for identical services, the district court relied on the fact that there was no statistically significant actual confusion

despite the use of both marks in the same geographic areas."27 The Fifth
Circuit reasserted that the proper test was likelihood of confusion and

reiterated that, while actual confusion is the best evidence of likelihood of
confusion, very little actual confusion is necessary to show likelihood of

confusion."18 Of course, no actual confusion need ever be shown.
In Aladdin Industries, Inc. v. Alladin Lamp & Shade Corp.,"'s the
court reversed as "clearly erroneous"'8 0 the district court's finding that

ALLADIN was not likely to be confused with ALADDIN when used on
related goods. Showing the desired perspicacity and circumspection referred to above, the court discovered several errors in the trial judge's
findings of underlying facts upon which he had based his conclusion"21 of
no likelihood of confusion. Plaintiff had used the mark ALADDIN on
kerosene lamps since 1908 and on lamps sold with an electric adapter

223. See, e.g., quote accompanying note 27 supra, and James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of
the Beefeaters, Inc., 540 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1976), discussed in note 125, supra.
224. The last Supreme Court opinion on the merits of a claim brought under the Lanham Act was Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); See note 87 supra, and
accompanying text. In Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714
(1967), the Supreme Court held only that attorneys' fees were not an enumerated compensatory remedy under the Lanham Act.
225. Derenberg, The Twenty-Ninth Year ...
66 TRADEMARK REP. 337, 396 (1976).
226. 513 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1975).
227. Contra, see Abramson v. Coro, Inc., 240 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1957), discussed in text
accompanying note 218 supra.
228. Accord, Roto-Rooter Corp. v. Soto, 172 U.S.P.Q. 334 (5th Cir. 1972), aff'g 171
U.S.P.Q. 555 (W.D. Tex. 1971). (SOTO ROOTER ROOTS likely to be confused with
ROTO-ROOTER).
229. 556 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1977).
230. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 52(a).
231. The trial court decision is unreported, but no mention is made in the appellate
decision of any jury finding.
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since the 1930's and had sold a special lamp shade along with its lamps.
Defendant sold only lamp shades which did not fit plaintiff's produgts.
The trial judge erroneously found that plaintiff did not use a graphic Arabian lamp design in conjunction with its corporate name on stationery
and brochures (defendant did so) and that a "genie" (used by defendant)
was not the same as a "jinn'2' described in the tales of Aladdin and the
Arabian Nights. In light of these factual errors, Judge Godbold believed
that plaintiff had carried the burden of proving likelihood of confusion.
In accordance with the established principles of prior decisions such as
Coro,2 3' Minute Maid,2' and Aetna, 3 the court said:
Though the parties' products might not compete directly, the evidence is
clear that the marketing practices and advertising materials of plaintiff
and defendant are sufficiently similar that a potential consumer would
likely conclude that both products issued from the same source. This is
the harmful confusion against which the trademark law protects.",
This short quotation reflects the essence of trademark law.
7
In T.G.I. Friday's, Inc. v. International Restaurant Group Inc.,"2
plaintiff-Friday's started a turn of the century motif restaurant and bar
for young singles in New York City. This venture was immediately so
successful that it opened other restaurants in New York, each with a different theme, under the names "Tuesday's", "Wednesday's", "Thursday's", and "Sunday's". Plaintiff then decided to franchise, the T.G.I.
FRIDAY'S registered service mark, establishing locations in Dallas, Little
Rock, Memphis, Nashville, and Jackson, Mississippi. Defendant-IRG's
principals were the same persons who, under a different business entity,
operated the Friday's franchise in Jackson and had requested a franchise
in Baton Rouge, which Friday's had denied. Subsequently IRG opened an
EVER LOVIN' SATURDAY'S (E.L. SATURDAY'S) restaurant and bar
in Baton Rouge which had strikingly similar decor. Because the marks
were obviously dissimilar visually and phonetically, plaintiff relied on an
association23 8 between "Friday" and "Saturday" and the same or similar
trade dress in attempting to establish its claim of infringement.
The equities of the situation seemed to favor plaintiff. The former
licensees, having been rejected in a bid to expand to a new location,
232.
fact, a
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Rubbing Aladdin's lamp is supposed to bring forth a "Jinn." 556 F.2d at 1265. In
"genie" and a "jinn" are synonyms. Id.
240 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1957). See note 29 supra, and accompanying text.
214 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1954). See note 28 supra, and accompanying text.
123 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1941). See note 19 supra, and accompanying text.
556 F.2d at 1265.
569 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1978).
See discussion of "clean" and "stain" accompanying note 245 infra.
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started on operation essentially duplicating Friday's except in name
alone, despite knowing full well from previous dealings that Friday's had
actually used the names of four other days of the week (although not
Saturday) for restaurant services. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of
relief. The court, however, would have been well-advised to remember the
words of the Second Circuit:
It is so easy for the honest businessman, who wishes to sell his goods
upon their merits, to select from the entire material universe, which is

before him, symbols, marks and coverings which by no possibility can
cause confusion between his goods and those of his competitors, that the
courts look with suspicion upon one who, in dressing his goods for the
market, approaches so near to his successful rival that the public may
fail to distinguish between them.'"

By combining the court's own intent argument in Blue Shield"0 with the
associationaltest of Procter& Gamble Co. v. Conway,24 1 the court would
have been forced to find for plaintiff."'
B. Protection Of Strong and Weak Marks Used On Related Goods
The word "holiday" is indeed common and has been used alone and in
conjunction with other words in promoting various motels and hotels.
However, by 1973 the mark HOLIDAY INN must be considered to have
been established as a strong mark for motel services on the basis of the
nationwide and worldwide advertising campaigns that have promoted the
mark. In fact, HOLIDAY INN had acquired secondary meaning." s In
Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out In America,' the Fifth Circuit evidently disagreed because it affirmed the district court's denial of injunctive relief to preclude use of the name HOLIDAY OUT for trailer park
services. This decision conflicts with an earlier well-reasoned opinion by
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.), which is considered
to be the more expert court in the area of trademark law. In Procter &
Gamble Co. v. Conway,'" Procter & Gamble appealed from a Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board decision dismissing Procter & Gamble's opposition to Conway's application to register MISTER STAIN for a stain re239. Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910).
240. 362 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1976). See note 110 supra, and accompanying text.
241. 419 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1970), discussed in text accompanying note 245 infra.
242. Cf. Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1978), in which the
internationally famous STORK CLUB in New York City successfully enjoined use of the
same name and symbol by a neighborhood club in San Francisco.
243. See Derenberg, The Twenty-Fifth Year ...
62 TRADEMARK REP. 393, 487 (1972).
244. .481 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1973).
245. 419 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
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moving compound. The C.C.P.A. reversed the dismissal and held that
Conway's mark was likely to cause confusion with Procter & Gamble's
registered marks MR. CLEAN, MR. CLEAR, MR. SHEEN, LADY
CLEAN, MRS. CLEAN and MASTERKLEAN, which were also used for
cleaning preparations. Admitting that the usual connotations of "clean"
and "stain" are opposite, the court stated:
But we think the cardinal consideration here is the impact of the marks
as used on the basis of conditions and circumstances surrounding the
purchase of the goods of the parties in the market place.
While here we have both aural and optical dissimilarity between stain
and clean, such factors are not"necessarily controlling on the issue of
likelihood of confusion in the market place. A designation may well be
likely to cause purchaser confusion as to the origin of goods because it
conveys, as used, the same idea, or stimulates the same mental reaction,
or in the ultimate has the same meaning. 40
HOLIDAY INN and HOLIDAY OUT may at first glance seem to be
opposites, but because of the word common to both, it does not stretch
the imagination too much to think that different but related services offered under these two marks could easily originate from the same source.
The cleaning preparations in Procter& Gamble v. Conway may be more
closely related than motel services and trailer park services, but these services are not so dissimilar that one would be surprised to discover that
both were operated by one owner. Both services cater to the traveling
public, providing different levels of services on comfort and price spectrums. In fact, Holiday Inn later entered the business of providing trailer
'
park services, using the name "Holiday Inn Trav-L-Park. "4

Holiday Out's conduct was particularly reprehensible because it used
not only the marks HOLIDAY OUT in its operations, but also HOLIDAY
OUT IN AMERICA and THE NATION'S CAMPGROUND. Holiday
Inns' other registered marks include HOLIDAY INN(S) OF AMERICA
and THE NATION'S INNKEEPER. As Professor Derenberg noted,
"The Court did not seem to place much significance on the fact that defendant had also used two other marks similar to those used by plain' 8

tiff."'

Fortunately, for Holiday Inn, not all of its cases have turned out

adversely."'9
246. Id. at 1335-36.
247. Derenberg, The Twenty-Fifth Year ...
62 TRADEmARK REP. 393, 446 (1972).
248. Derenberg, The Twenty-Seventh Year .. , 64 TRADEMARK RE. 339, 415 (1974).
249. It seems a book could be written about litigation involving the mark HOLIDAY
INN. See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inn, 534 F.2d 312 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (Myrtle Beach,
S.C. local user entitled to concurrent registration restricted to that town); Holiday Inns, Inc.
v. Holiday Inn, 498 F.2d 1397 (4th Cir. 1974), affd, 364 F. Supp. 775 (D.S.C. 1973) (defen-
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Surprisingly, the court quickly did an about face from the Holiday Inns
decision and recognized the deleteridus cumulative effect of using several
marks of a registrant. In Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Rickard, 5 ' the court emphasized the impact of defendant's use of more than
one of plaintiff's marks. In a strong protectionist opinion, Judge Simpson
first affirmed the district court's holding that the shape of VW's "Beetle"
automobile and the appellation of "Bug" had achieved common law
trademark status. Rickard, who had never had any connection with
Volkswagen or its dealers, operated a repair shop under the name "The
Bug Shop" in addition to using and displaying the registered marks
VOLKSWAGEN, VW (overlapping V and W inscribed in a circle), and
the "Beetle" silhouette. The court noted, a year too late to help Holiday
Inn, "[flinally, Rickard utilized not one, but five of VWAG's marks, the
cumulative effect of which is greater likelihood of confusion." 5 ' "The
point seems to be well-taken since the intentional copying of several
'25 2
trademarks would indeed indicate an intent to mislead the public.
In what is the most thoroughly annotated opinion of the decade, the
court affirmed findings of trademark infringement and unfair competition
dant-prior local user allowed to use HOLIDAY INN in town of Myrtle Beach, S.C., but
enjoined from using colorable imitation of chain's "Great Sign," script lettering and/or slogan, "Your Host from Coast to Coast"); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. B & B Corp., 409 F.2d 614 (3d
Cir. 1969) (plaintiff not allowed to enjoin use of HOLIDAY INN and HOLIDAY INN OF
ST. THOMAS by "sleazy" hotel in Virgin Islands because plaintiff had no motel operating
in the Virgin Islands, although it did have one less than 100 miles away in San Juan, Puerto
Rico-even though court admitted that defendant would profit by plaintiff's vast advertising expenditures and such use was likely to deceive the public; Derenberg called the decision "highly questionable"); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Alberding, 203 U.S.P.Q. 273 (N.D. Tex.
1978) (preliminary injunction issued against use of HOLIDAY INN by former licensee);
Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Mullen's Holiday Inn, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 755 (E.D. Cal. 1968) (plaintiff's motion for summary judgment granted-rights superior to subsequent user); Holiday
Inns, Inc. v. Holiday House, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. Pa. 1968) (declaratory judgment
action in federal court not appropriate when practically identical issues were pending in
state court suit); Allington v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 156 U.S.P.Q. 278 (D. Idaho 1967) (federal
registrant has supervisor rights over subsequent uger-plaintiff allowed to use "Holiday
Motel" and "Holiday"); Zimmerman v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 438 Pa. 528, 266 A.2d 87, 166
U.S.P.Q. 52 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1972) (chain enjoined from "encroaching" on
prior user's local area-22 mile radius around Harrisburg-but allowed to advertise there);
Zimmerman v. B & C Motel Corp., 163 A.2d 884, 127 U.S.P.Q. 177 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1960)
(defendant-licensee of Holiday Inn not enjoined for unfair competition with plaintiff's Holiday West and Holiday East motels in Harrisburg area, when defendant was doing business
75 and 90 miles, respectively, away from plaintiff's two locations, but along same turnpike);
Holiday House, Inc. v. Apico Inns, Inc., 158 U.S.P.A. 59 (Pa. Ct. Com. PIs. 1968) (defendant-licensee's motion for summary judgment granted based on constructive notice provision, § 22 of Lanham Act 15 U.S.C. §1072 (1976).
250. 492 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1974).
251. Id. at 479.
64 TRADEMARK REP. 339, 417 (1974).
252. Derenberg, The Twenty-Seventh Year .
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in Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packing Corp.25 8 Briefly,
KFC either sold necessary supplies related to the sale of chicken such as
cardboard cartons, napkins, and towelettes directly to its franchisees or
allowed the franchisees to purchase the items from other suppliers which
had been approved by KFC. KFC had never refused to approve an independent supplier that had requested to be placed on the approved-source
list. Defendant began selling inferior quality cartons to KFC's franchisees
without first seeking approval. Among the tactics used by defendant to
mislead the franchisees were: (1) using KFC's registered trademarks, colors, and overall trade dress on the cartons; (2) using KFC's trademarks on
advertising materials and stationery; (3) distributing advertising material
which included the phrase "Buy Direct and Save," implying an affiliation
with KFC; (4) shipping the cartons to franchisees in cases bearing the
seven-digit part numbers "6015002" and "6014002" which closely resembled KFC's actual part numbers "6020051" and "6020041," when, in fact,
defendant only sold four different items; and (5) representing to franchisees that they sold "approved" cartons.
With such a multi-faceted attempt to deceive the franchisees, it is not
surprising that the court affirmed the finding of unfair competition, which
is broader than the law of trademark infringement. The court also affirmed the district court's judgment of trademark infringement, but it did
so only in the context of the overall scheme to deceive, not solely on the
basis of the unauthorized use of KFC's trademarks printed on the cardboard cartons. "When such confusion exists, trademark infringement exists regardless of whether the use of the marks, standing alone, would
have created confusion." * The authors believe that a literal and practical construction of section 32(1)(a) of the Lanham Act 25 5 would preclude
the simple act of using without authorization another's trademark for
profit as described in this case.
The court made short shrift of defendant's argument that KFC's registered marks were for chicken, not cartons. Noting that the marks could
hardly be embossed on the chicken itself, the court held, "[tihere is a
symbiotic relationship between Kentucky Fried Chicken and its cartons
and accoutrements. Under these circumstances we hold that the registration is sufficient to encompass the tangential supplies."""6 Regardless of
the court's answers to defendant's technical arguments regarding the differences between chicken and cartons, the court also held that KFC's registered marks were common law marks as applied to cartons, and it reviewed prior decisions holding that use of a mark on a different product
253.
254.
255.
256.

549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 390 (footnote omitted).
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1963).
549 F.2d at 388.
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from that named in the registration is no defense. " The court clearly
reached the correct result in a generally well-written and comprehensive
opinion by Judge Goldberg.
Exercising its power to reverse the district court for a clearly erroneous
decision,2 5 8 the court struck down a preliminary injunction prohibiting
the use of "Peale Vision Center" as a trade name in New Orleans by the
federal registrant of VISION CENTER as a trademark and a service
mark. In Vision Center v. Opticks, Inc.,s5 1 plaintiff had been continuously
using "The Vision Center" as a trade name since 1955 in New Orleans.
This use preceded defendant's federal registration by 15 years. The trial
court had held that "The Vision Center" was a suggestive trade name, or
if not suggestive, descriptive but having acquired a secondary meaning.
The Fifth Circuit disagreed and held, relying on the dictionary meanings
of "vision" and "center," that "vision center" was descriptive of products
and services provided by an optical store and, since no independent survey evidence was introduced to show secondary meaning, "Pearle" adequately distinguished defendant's optical store from plaintiff's. The court
was clearly correct on these facts.
An interesting and unusual situation arose in arguing the Vision Center
case. The plaintiff (non-registrant and prior local user) argued that defendant's federal registrations were prima facie evidence' " that "vision
center" was distinctive while defendant (federal registrant) argued
against the validity of its registrations and even offered the court a "bargain"-voluntary cancellation of its registration in exchange for a reversal
of the preliminary injunction, a request not accepted by the court."' 1
In harmony with the Vision Center case and another Fifth Circuit decision, " " the court properly affirmed the trial court's determination that
Shell Oil's use of the word "larvicide" in two product names, "Shell Poultry Spray and Larvicide" and "RABON Oral Larvicide," was a fair use
because it merely described the goods. In Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 6 2
Soweco brought suit for infringement of its registered mark LARVACIDE
and for unfair competition. Because Shell Oil's products did kill only lar-

257. Id.
258. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
259. 596 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1016 (1980); see First Southern
Fed. Say. v. First Southern Say., 614 F.2d 71, (5th Cir. 1980), in which the court held that,
'Because 'First Southern' is a combination of a generic and a geographical term, we conclude that it is not subject to protection under Mississippi common law." Id. at 74.
260. See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1976).
261. See 596 F.2d at 116 n.12.
262. American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1974),
discussed in text accompanying note 290, infra.
263. 617 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1980) (hereinafter referred to as Larvacide).
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vae, its use of "larvicide" was a generic, fair use." 4 However, since
Soweco's product killed vermin other than larvae, its mark, LARVACIDE, was descriptive, not generic, and was presumed to have acquired
secondary meaning since the mark had been used for at least five continuous years. Therefore, its registration had become incontestable6 3 and
the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's order to cancel Soweco's
registration.
The Vision Center and Soweco opinions indicate that all is not lost in
the Fifth Circuit, contrary to what may be inferred from the discussion,
infra, of other recent decisions of the Fifth Circuit."6 Vision Center and
Soweco, although contemporaries of the latter decisions, represent careful
analysis of the mariks themselves and the way in which the marks are
used to identify products. It is hoped that all of the Fifth Circuit's opinions in the future will reflect this kind of careful thought. It would indeed
be regrettable if a dichotomous split developed and the outcome of a case
would depend upon the make up of the particular panel which decides it,
as has been the history of the Second Circuit.'1
C. Amount Of Use Required For Trademark Validity
It is often said that trademark rights are established by use, not by
registration, which merely provides some procedural advantages. But how
much use is required to establish a bona fide trademark? The court faced
this question in Blue Bell, Inc. v. FarahManufacturing Co.s" Both parties filed claims of common law trademark infringement under Texas law,
each seeking to enjoin the other from using the mark TIME OUT on
men's slacks and shirts. On July 3, 1973, Farah had sent one pair of slacks
bearing the mark to each of twelve regional sales managers, each of whom
actually paid for the goods. The first shipments to Farah's customers (retail stores) occurred in September, 1973. On July 5, 1973, Blue Bell had
attached labels bearing the TIME OUT mark on a regular shipment of its
MR. HICKS slacks, in effect double labeling the shipment. Blue Bell's
first bona fide shipments of TIME OUT slacks to customers occurred in
October. On this record the trial court entered a permanent injunction in
favor of Farah on the basis of the September shipments to customers, the
first bona fide use of the mark. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The decision
was logically sound and comports with two 1974 decisions in the Second
264. Cf. Frostie Co. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 341 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1965) (not a descriptive
use). See note 182 supra, and accompanying text.
265. See 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1976).
266. See Part V, infra.
267. See generally Goldberg and Borchard, Related Goods Trademark Cases in the Second Circuit, 70 TRADEMARK Rap. 287 (1980). See also note 1, supra, and accompanying text.
268. 508 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1975).
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up by inconsequential or

D. Unauthorized Sale of the Design of the Mark
Normally a trademark or service mark is used to identify, advertise and
sell goods or services associated in the consumer's mind with the mark. In
70
Boston ProfessionalHockey Association v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Co.,1
the court faced the unusual question of whether an unauthorized manufacturer and seller of cloth patches embroidered with the design of the
registered service marks of the various teams comprising the National
Hockey League was guilty of service mark infringement. The trial court
had denied relief because it thought that granting protection would be
tantamount to creating a copyright monopoly for designs which were not
copyrighted.2 7 After noting the difference in theory between copyright
protection and trademark protection,'"2 Judge Roney, writing for Chief
Judge Brown and Judge Godbold, went on to consider the two difficult
hurdles to finding service mark infringement: Were the marks used in
connection with the sale of goods, and was such use likely to cause confu269. LaSociete Anonyme des Parfumes Le Galion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265 (2d
Cir. 1974) (SNOB perfume case-89 sales in 20 years not bona fide commercial exploitation); Blue Bell, Inc. v. Jasyman-Ruby, Inc., 497 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1974) (shipment to cooperative company which returned the goods--considered sham transaction).
270. 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1976) (hereinafter referred
to as Hockey Emblem). See 597 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1979) (issue of damages). See also International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 913, 918 n.10 (9th Cir.
1980), in which the court said:
The Fifth Circuit itself has apparently retreated from a broad interpretation of
Boston Hockey. In Kentucky Fired Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp.,
549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977), the court began its analysis of Kentucky Fried
Chicken's infringement claim by noting that it "reject[ed] any notion that a trademark is an owner's 'property' to be protected irrespective of its role in the protection of our markets," and described the Boston Hockey holding as premised on a
finding that customers were likely to believe that the emblem somehow originated
from the hockey clubs. 549 F.2d at 389.
The authors take issue with the fact that the Fifth Circuit has retreated. The quotation
merely holds that the Boston Hockey case correctly construed the likelihood of confusion
tests, namely, that the customers (consumers) were likely to believe that the emblem somehow originated from the hockey clubs.
271. 510 F.2d at 1010.
272. Copyrighted material eventually passes into the public domain while a trademark
may be preserved forever. Id. at 1010-11.
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sion, mistake, or deception? 78

The court had little trouble in deciding that the emblems constituted
"goods" despite the fact that the service mark design covered the face of
the emblem 2 74 The emblems were the goods, and if it were not for the
affixing of the teams' marks, there would be no market for the emblems.
The more difficult conceptual problem arose in deciding that sales by
the defendant "confused" the public. The district court had found no
likelihood of confusion because it felt that the sports fan, purchasing emblems in his local sporting goods store, would not be likely to think that
were manufactured by or had some connection with plainthe 2emblems
75
tiffs.

The court noted that the district court had overlooked the 1962

amendment of section 32 of the Lanham Act which had eliminated the
requirement that the purchaser be confused or deceived as to the source
of origin of the goods or services.' 7 "The confusion or deceit requirement
is met by the fact that the defendant duplicated the protected trademarks and sold them to the public knowing that the public would identify
them as being the teams' trademarks."' 77
Note the elements of unjust enrichment of the defendant implied in the
court's decision. Many sports fans might purchase defendant's emblems
not only to show support for their favorite teams but also to contribute
financially to the clubs. Allowing defendant's challenged activities would
result in defendant filling its coffers with nothing going to the teams. Additionally, defendant had previously attempted unsuccessfully to negotiate an exclusive license agreement with the NHL.
Three major considerations persuaded the court of the correctness of
its decision.
Underlying our decision are three persuasive points. First, the major
commercial value of the emblems is derived from the efforts of plaintiffs.
Second, defendant sought and ostensibly would have asserted, if obtained, an exclusive right to make and sell the emblems. Third, the sale

of a reproduction of the trademark itself on an emblem is an accepted
use of such team symbols in connection with the78type of activity in which
the business of professional sports is engaged.

On the pendent state law unfair competition claim, the trial court had

found unfair competition and ordered defendant to include a disclaimer
273. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1976).
274. 510 F.2d at 1011.
275. Id. at 1012.
276. See Act of October 9, 1962, Pub. L. 87-772, 76 Stat. 769. See also Historical Note
following 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114 (1963).
277. 510 F.2d at 1012.
278. Id. at 1011.

1981]

TRADEMARK PROTECTION

1213

of association with the NHL in or on all packaging. The Fifth Circuit
correctly held that this would be an ineffective remedy to prevent confu7
sion of the public .2
It is extremely puzzling that in an opinion which clearly "does justice"
and reflects a proper application of the Lanham Act, Judge Roney felt the
need to apologize for protecting the legitimate owners of registered

marks, which are valuable commercial symbols:
Although our decision here may slightly tilt the trademark laws from the
purpose of protecting the public to the protection of the business interests of plaintiffs, we think that the two become so intermeshed when
viewed against the backdrop of the common law of unfair competition
that both the public and
plaintiffs are better served by granting the relief
80
sought by plaintiffs.

The interests of the public and the business interests of trademark owners coincide! s 1 The public interest is served by permitting consumers to
identify and classify a product, favorably or unfavorably, by its mark.
This also benefits every honest producer or seller who does not need

Judge Learned Hand's "mask" to hide behind.
279. Id. at 1013. For a discussion of the section 43(a) claims made in this case, see text
accompanying note 282 infra. Other courts considering issues similar to those involved in
Hockey Emblem have come to like conclusions. See Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v.
Reliable Knitting Works, Inc., 178 U.S.P.Q. 274 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (preliminary injunction
granted to prevent use of emblems on knit caps); NFL Properties, Inc. v. Consumer Enterprises, Inc., 185 U.S.P.Q. 550, 327 N.E.2d 242 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1018 (1975) (also an emblem case involving NFL team insignias-the court rejected a Sears/
Compo defense by holding that a trademark is not an "article" contemplated by those decisions which can be copies, and the court rejected the reasoning of the opinion of trial court
in Hockey Emblem, 360 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Tex. 1973)); NFL Properties, Inc. v. Dallas Cap
& Emblem Mfg., Inc., 185 U.S.P.Q. 554, 327 N.E. 2d 247 (Il. App. Ct. 1975) (disclaimer of
association with NFL not adequate-full preliminary injunction justified).
280. 510 F.2d at 1011. Judge Roney should have been cognizant of Justice Frankfurter's
famous quotation:
The protection of trademarks is the law's recognition of the psychological function
of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase
goods by them. A trademark is a merchandising shortcut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. The
owner of a trademark exploits this human propensity by making every human
effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a
congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed, the aim is the same - to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the
commodity upon which it appears. Once this is attained, the trademark owner has
something of value. If another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the
symbol he has created, the owner can obtain legal redress.
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
281. See, e.g., Lunsford, Consumers and Trademarks: The Function of Trademarks in
the Market Place, 64 TRADE ARK REP. 75 (1974). See also note 288 infra.
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E. Section 43(a) Is "Discovered"
During the 1970's section 43(a) 282 came to full bloom as an independent
cause of action in the Fifth Circuit, long after it had blossomed in other
circuits. Whether this delay was caused by a paucity of appropriate factual situations involving a claim of trademark infringement or by a hesitancy on the part of counsel to advance a "new" theory is undetermined.
Whatever the reason, it was 1971 before the court had the opportunity to
recognize explicitly that section 43(a) provided a cause of action for false
description or representation even in the absence of plaintiffs' owning a
registered mark.
In Alum-A-Fold Shutter Corp. v. Folding Shutter Corp.,' the court
finally had the appropriate case in which to hold that a claim brought
under section 43(a) was viable in and of itself. Plaintiff-Alum-A-Fold, a
manufacturer of folding aluminum shutters, alleged that defendant had
copied plaintiff's shutters and advertising material. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of federal question jurisdiction, citing
Royal Lace Paper Works, Inc. v. Pest-GuardProducts, Inc.'" Affirming
the correctness of that decision, the court noted the weight of authority
from other circuits.. 5 and quoted the Third Circuit as follows:
It seems to us that Congress has defined a statutory civil wrong of false
representation of goods in commerce and has given a broad class of suitors injured or likely to be injured by such wrong the right to relief in the
federal courts. This statutory tort is defined in language which differentiates it in some particulars from similar wrongs which have developed and
have become defined in the judge made law of unfair competition....
282. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976) provides:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods
or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of origin,
or any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the
falsity of such designation of origin or description or representation cause or procure the same to be transported or used in commerce or deliver the same to any
carrier to be transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action by any person
doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in
which said locality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is likely
to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.
283. 441 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1971).
284. 240 F.2d 814 (no independent cause of action under section 44 of the Lanham Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1126 (1976)). See note 80 supra, and accompanying text.
285. Bernard Food Indus., Inc. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1969); FederalMogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1963); L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v.
Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954); Samson Crane Co. v. Union National Sales,
Inc., 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950).
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But however similar to or different from pre-existing law, here is a provision of a federal statute which, with clarity and precision adequate for
judicial administration, creates and defines rights and duties and provides for their vindication in the federal courts.2 86
Because the court held only that the complaint alleged a cause of action sufficient for federal court jurisdiction in Alum-A-Fold, it did not
construe or apply section 43(a) substantively. That opportunity came the
28 7
following year in Norman M. Morris Corp. v. Weinstein.
The plaintiffcorporation was the exclusive United States sales agent for OMEGA
watches. Weinstein was buying OMEGA watches in Europe, obliterating
the serial numbers, selling the watches in the United States, and providing a guarantee certificate confusingly similar to the original. The watches
were indeed genuine OMEGA watches, but because the serial numbers
had been obliterated, the manufacturer could not honor its warranty.
Thus the false representations of the fake warranty adversely affected the
reputation and goodwill of the manufacturer and plaintiff. In affirming,
with some modifications, the trial court's permanent injunction, the Fifth
Circuit noted the public's interest in a civil action under section 43(a) 8 8
and compared the action to the common law of unfair competition. 88
In American Heritage Life Insurance Co. v. Heritage Life Insurance
Co.,28 0 the court had to determine whether HLIC's use of HERITAGE
constituted a false description or representation under section 43(a) because of AHLIC's prior use of the word. Relying on the dictionary definition of "heritage"2 91 and the failure of AHLIC to demonstrate that the
term had acquired a secondary meaning, "a single thing coming from a
single source," ' as applied to its insurance services, the court held that
"heritage" was either generic or highly descriptive of the insurance indus286. L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. 214 F.2d at 651; quoted in Alum-A-Fold, 441 F.2d at 557.
Some may wonder about the "clarity and precision" with which judges have interpreted the
section.
287. 466 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
288. It is well settled that one of the purposes which the law (of unfair competition]
intends to subserve when it gives a right to an injured person to protection from
unfair competition and provides a remedy to bring about such protection, is to
afford protection also to the general public.
Id. at 140.
289. "The intent of Congress in enacting § 1125(a), supra, dealing with the false descriptions or representations of articles in commerce was clearly to fashion a new federal remedy
against a particular kind of unfair competition that the common law had effectively protected ..
" Id. at 141.
290. 494 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1974).
291.

"Something that descends to an heir; something transmitted or acquired from a

predecessor; a legacy." Id. at 11.
292. Id. at 12 (citing Aloe Creme Labs, Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., 423 F.2d 845, 849 (5th Cir.
1970)).
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try and ordered cancellation of AHLIC's service mark registration. 9 8
The court considered the section 43(a) claims made in Hockey EmbleM2 94 only with regard to the NHL's Toronto franchise because it was
the only club which did not have a registered service mark and did not
obtain relief under the service mark infringement claim. Because the likelihood of confusion standard is common to claims made under both section 32(1)295 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the court had no difficulty
determining that Dallas Cap & Emblem had used a symbol (Toronto's
service mark) which tended falsely to represent goods (embroidered emblems) in commerce.2
Using a picture of a competitor's goods to advertise and sell one's own
product is the epitome of false representation of goods in commerce, and
the Fifth Circuit duly affirmed the trial court's verdict proscribing 2such
conduct in Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Universal Marine Co. 9
The Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders brought claims of copyright infringement, false representation under section 43(a), and common law unfair
competition against the publisher of a spin-off poster similar in many respects to the cheerleader's copyrighted poster. In Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters,'" the court affirmed a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the distribution of defendant's posters over a defense based on first amendment rights of free speech and press. Plaintiff's
poster featured five of the cheerleaders posing in their well-known
uniforms with a caption that read, "The Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders."
Defendant's poster featured five former Dallas Cheerleaders in nearly
identical costumes but posing with their blouses unbuttoned exposing
their breasts with a caption that read, "The Ex-Dallas Cheerleaders." Observing that "[tihe first amendment is not a license to trammel on legally
recognized rights in intellectual property," 2" the court affirmed the preliminary injunction only on the basis of probable copyright infringement.
It is likely that the same result would have been reached on claims of
trademark infringement and/or false representation based on a nearly
contemporaneous decision of the Second Circuit.
In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders,Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.,83" the
Second Circuit also affirmed a preliminary injunction over a first amend293. See 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (1976).
294. 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975). See note 270 supra, and accompanying text.
295. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1976).
296. 510 F.2d at 1012-13. See note 278 supra, and accompanying text.
297. 543 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1976). Accord, Truck Equipment Service Co. v. Fruehauf
Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976).
298. 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1979).
299. Id. at 1188.
300. 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
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ment defense to prevent the showing of the movie, "Debbie Does Dallas."
The movie featured a woman, who had never been a Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleader, who engaged in various sexual acts and was somethimes
clothed or partially clothed in a uniform closely simulating the Dallas
group's uniform. The court found that the uniform had attained trademark status and that the "message" of the movie could be propounded
without the appropriation of another's trademark.
It should be evident that the number of affronts which may be remedied under the auspices of section 43(a) may be nearly limitless and that
the statute is the basis for a federal "common law" of unfair competition,
no matter with how much "clarity and precision"3 0'1 Congress intended to
write into law. As one court has noted, "[u]nfair competition is not defined in terms of specific elements, but instead by the description of vari30 2
ous acts that would constitute the tort if they resulted in damage.
F. Licensing of Trademarks and Antitrust Considerations
A situation comparably as novel as the posture of the parties in the
Vision Center case3s came to light in Sheila's Shine Products, Inc. v.
Sheila Shine, Inc .30 Defendant-Sheila Shine (a Florida corporation) was
the former, and at-.the time of litigation the putative, licensee of plaintiffSheila's Shine Products (a California corporation), maker of a wood and
metal polish. Subsequent to 1956 the Florida defendant used the mark
without any supervision or control and gradually expanded its operations
until it reached plaintiff's trade territory on the West Coast in 1964. At
that time plaintiff-licensor changed its label to simulate defendant-licensee's label and sued for infringement. On the basis of the licensor's failure
to exercise control and supervision over the licensee, the district court,
later affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, awarded concurrent rights in the mark
SHEILA SHINE to the former licensee and established its trade territory
to be any areas it had expanded into which did not conflict with the areas
where plaintiff still used the mark. The court considered use in any part
of a state to establish a claim to the whole state. Professor Derenberg
criticized this state boundary rule as being "somewhat too arbitrary and
one more closely tied to the real markets for the products would be more
desirable."305
A former service mark licensee was estopped from challenging the va301.
302.
(D.D.C.
303.
304.
305.

See note 286 supra, and accompanying text.
Business Equipment Center, Ltd. v. DeJur-Amsco Corp., 465 F. Supp. 775, 778
1978).
596 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1979). See note 259 supra, and accompanying text.
486 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1973).
Derenberg, The Twenty-Seventh Year .
64 TRADEMARK REP. 339, 416 (1974).
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lidity of a trademark during the period of the license agreement in Professional Golfers Association v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.'" The
plaintiff owned the collective mark " PGA and agreed to identify defendant's golf club facilities with the mark in exchange for office space in the
development. When the parties severed their ties, defendant continued to
use the designation PGA. The district court, affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, held that continued use of the mark constituted both infringement
of the service mark and unfair competition. In evaluating defendant's
abandonment defense, the court considered conflicting authorityS8" on the
appropriate duration of licensee estoppel and settled on the middle
ground, reflected by the rule stated above. The court noted, however, that
a former licensee may challenge the validity of a licensor's mark based on
facts which arise after the license agreement expires.
In the comprehensive Kentucky Fried Chicken case, 8 9 the Fifth Circuit reiterated the general rule that a trademark licensor has a duty to
oversee the quality of its licensees' products, citing Denison Mattress
Factory v. Spring-Air Co.' 10 The court explained the rationale for the
rule by stating, "If a trademark owner allows licensees to depart from its
quality standards, the public will be misled, and the trademark will cease
to have utility as an informational device." 11 However, the court went on
to say that "[r]etention of a trademark requires bnly minimal quality
control." 12
In considering the antitrust counterclaims raised by defendant, the
court affirmed the general rule that a trademark can be a tying device in
the context of a franchise sales operation. 18 However, the court did not
306. 514 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1975). Apparently the Supreme Court concurs. In Patricelli v.
Mecca, Ltd., U.S.S.Ct. No. 80-723, reported at 512 PTCJ A-15 (1/15/81), the Court denied
certiorari to the Second Circuit for a case in which that court upheld a ruling (see 505 PTCJ
A-12) that Patricelli's former status as licensee of the MISS WORLD mark estopped him
from challenging the mark's validity, despite Patricelli's claim that the licensor had procured the mark by fraud.
307. See 15 U.S.C. § 1054 (1976).
308. See 514 F.2d at 671.
309. 549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977). See note 253 supra, and accompanying text.
310. 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962). See note 180 supra, and accompanying text.
311. 549 F.2d at 387.
312. Id.
313. Accord, Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1976); Warriner
Hermetics, Inc. v. Copeland Refrigeration Corp., 463 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1086 (1972); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971). Cf. Redd v.
Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1975), in which the court distinguished fast food
franchise operations as selling more of a service than an actual product such as the bulk gas
involved here, which it viewed as a marked, package good without the package. Query. Is
this a distinction without a difference? Could not quality standards assure the grade of
gasoline acceptable to Shell Oil just as quality standards assure the proper taste of chicken?
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find KFC's use of its mark to be an illegal tying device because KFC
allowed its franchisees to purchase their supplies of cartons from any of
ten suppliers on an approved source list, only one of which was connected
with KFC. Such a method of operation allowed competition among the
suppliers while it concomitantly assured KFC that its quality standards
would be met. The approved-source list places a minimal burden on commerce and could be less restrictive only by having more suppliers on the
list. The court noted that the record indicated that KFC had never withheld aproval from a supplier who had requested it.8 1'
G. Reverse Confusion
The doctrine of reverse confusion recently received a great deal of publicity as the result of a $19,600,000 damages award by a jury to the plaintiff in Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,818 although this figure was reduced substantially on appeal. 1 6 In that case,
the jury found that defendant had infringed and disparaged plaintiff's
common law trademark BIG FOOT, used for automobile tires, by its actions in promoting its own BIGFOOT tire. The acts of disparagement
tended to cause "reverse confusion," i.e., although not true, it would seem
that the plaintiff-prior local user of BIG FOOT was the infringer because
of defendant-nationally known manufacturer's vast advertising campaign.
In Capital Films Corp. v. Charles Fries Productions, Inc.,8 "7 the Fifth
Circuit recently held that nothing in the Texas law of unfair competition
would prohibit the application of the reverse confusion doctrine, and thus'
vacated a summary judgment granted in favor of defendants. The lower
court also erred in treating a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss as a motion for
summary judgment without observing the appropriate notice and hearing
requirements. Plaintiff had purchased a film entitled "The Trial of Lee
Harvey Oswald," made in 1964, which had been shown briefly and then
withdrawn from circulation. The film depicted a fictitious account of
what would have occurred at the trial of President Kennedy's alleged
assassin. In 1976, Charles Fries Productions and the American Broadcasting Company television network produced a new movie of the same title
representing the same fictitious events. Despite knowledge of plaintiff's
intent to re-release the original film, ABC televised the second production
in 1977. The court's receptiveness to a "new" theory without precedent in
See Lunsford, Trademarks and the Antitrust Law: Complete Compatibility-No Divorce

Needed, 65

TRADEMARK

REP. 463 (1975).

314. 549 F.2d at 378.
315. 408 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Colo. 1976).
316. 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977).
317. 628 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1980).
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the circuit is to be commended and applauded by all those with an interest in protecting intellectual property rights.
H.

Jurisdictionand Procedure

Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co. 18 presented a very unusual fact
situation on which the Fifth Circuit had to determine whether plaintiff's
mark remained valid in the United States after confiscation of the Cuban
corporation-registrant by the Castro regime. Prior to the seizure of the
corporation, Maltina had brewed a non-alcoholic carbonated malt beverage and marketed it under the mark CERVEZA CRISTAL plus design.
Considering the mark to be abandoned or invalid, Cawy subsequently began marketing a similar beverage under the mark CRISTAL. A group of
Maltina's officers and directors which had fled to Miami formed an American business in order to assign the rights to the mark and to challenge
Cawy's use of CRISTAL. The Fifth Circuit panel of Judges Wisdom and
Coleman, with Judge Simpson dissenting, reversed the trial court's denial
of relief to plaintiff. The court held that the trademark registration in the
United States had a separate identity and situs apart from the foreign
corporation"' and treated the dissolution of the foreign corporation as an
expropriation of property, the trademark rights, located in the United
States. The court concluded that such expropriation would constitute a
deprivation of property without compensation in violation of the fifth
amendment, and, therefore, the original owner, now represented by the
assignee, retained the United States trademark rights. Furthermore, the
assignee's lack of use of the mark since the Castro takeover was due to
"special circumstances" not accompanied by any intention to abandon
the mark. 20 Even under these extremely unusual circumstances, the Su-

318. 462 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1060 (1972).
319. See 15 U.S.C. § 1126(0 (1976), which provides:
The registration of a mark under the provisions of subsections (c), (d), and (e) of
this section by a person described in subsection (b) of this section shall be independent of the registration in the country of origin and the duration, validity, or
transfer in the United States of such registration shall be governed by the provisions of this chapter.
320. 15 U.S.C. § 1058(a) (1976) provides:
Each certificate of registration shall remain in force for twenty years: Provided,
That the registration of any mark under the provisions of this chapter shall be
canceled by the Commissioner at the end of six years following its date, unless
within one year next preceeding the expiration of such six years the registrant
shall file in the Patent Office an affidavit showing that said mark is still in use or
showing that its nonuse is due to special circumstances which excuse such nonuse
and is not due to any intention to abandon the mark. Special notice of the requirement for such affidavit shall be attached to each certificate of registration.
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preme Court expressed no interest in the case. 8 2 ' •
The court in Maltina made a wise decision in allowing the remaining
representatives of the original owners to retain the rights to their mark.
The events leading up to their "abandonment" of the mark were certainly
outside their control, and defendants intentionally tried to capitalize on a
mark made known through the efforts of others. Finally, throughout the
history of trademark law trademarks have been accorded some or all of
the attributes of tangible property. Thus, there was no reason to deprive
this group of its property rights as long as it was making a bona fide
attempt to use the mark in commerce once again.
In the Heritage case,8 22 the court, in addition to its substantive rulings,
also held that no res judicata or collateral estoppel effect could be accorded to a prior district court action affirming a decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board which sustained the registration of HERITAGE as a service mark by defendant, Heritage Life Insurance Company,
on the basis of likelihood of confusion. The court reasoned that since the
action was for trademark infringement and false representation under
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 2's opposition proceedings could not be
given res judicata effect because the cause of action was different. Nor
could it be given collateral estoppel effect because the earlier proceedings
made no specific findings of fact.8"
The court affirmed the dismissal of a declaratory judgment actions'"
brought after defendant had filed an opposition to plaintiff's application
to register its service mark in Red Lobster Inns of America, Inc. v. New
England Oyster House, Inc."' Basing its decision on the fact that an opposition does not constitute a claim of infringement, the court held that
no actual controversy existed sufficient to support a declaratory judgment
action. The USTA's Annual Review Committee noted that while the deci321. See note 318 supra. Epilogue: eight years later the case was still being litigated. The
Fifth Circuit awarded defendant's profits as damages (see 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1976)), holding
that diversion of sales is not a prerequisite to an award of damages; unjust enrichment justifies the award, especially where defendant wilfully infringes plaintiff's mark. 613 F.2d 582
(5th Cir. 1980) (appeal from trial on the merits of infringement).
322. 494 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1974). See note 290 supra, and accompanying text.
323. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976).
324. Cf. Flavor Corp. v. Kemin Indus., Inc., 493 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1974), in which the
court held that a finding of likelihood of confusion by C.C.P.A. collaterally estopped relitigation in an infringement action, even though C.C.P.A. could not have had jurisdiction over
the infringement action. Note that this decision has never been cited for this proposition by
any other court, and it has been criticized by commentators; see, e.g., Fletcher, The Pestlur
Case-CollateralEstoppel Effect of C.C.P.A. and T.T.A.B. Decisions-ActualConfusion as
to Incontestability of Descriptive Marks, 64 TRADMARK REP. 252, 257 (1974).
325. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976).
326. 524 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
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sion followed established precedent,""1 the better rule would seem to be to
allow the declaratory judgment action since a notice of opposition constitutes a clear assertion of trademark rights and is a real threat that should
be finally resolvable through the declaratory judgment procedure."2 '
In Bangor Punta Operations,Inc. v. Universal Marine Co., s2 the court
upheld the assertion of jurisdiction by a federal district court in Florida
over acts of false advertising violating section 43(a). Although the defendant was reachable only under the Florida Long Arm Statute, the acts
complained of had occurred in Florida.
Finally, in Warehouse Groceries Management, Inc. v. Sav-U-Warehouse Groceries, Inc.,s s0 the court affirmed the denial of a preliminary
injunction but chastised the district court " ' for consolidating3 2 a hearing
on the merits with the hearing on a preliminary injunction but providing
notice of the consolidation only after the preliminary hearing. The court
also criticized the lower court for dismissing the pendent state law claims
on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction.8 2

V.

1979-80:

DECLINE AND

FALL

As the court turned the corner on the 1970's and entered the 1980's,
the staccato burst of three decisions in a relatively short period set the
trademark bar reeling, trying to assess what impact these decisions would
have on future litigation. The decisions are the World Carpets II case, s
Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc.,338 and Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor
Exchange, Inc.s s1 Each of the decisions is subject to question and criticism. What is particularly foreboding is that no one particular panel of
judges was involved, thus the mistaken interpretations of well-reasoned
precedents are more widespread than might otherwise be the case. Only
Judge Henderson voted consistently in as many as two of the decisions
(Domino and Exxon), but he wrote neither opinion. Chief Judge Brown
327.

See e.g., Merrick v. Sharp & Dohme, 185 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340

U.S. 954 (1951).
328. The Twenty-Ninth Year ...
66 TRADEmARK REP., 337, 397 (1976).
329. 543 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1976). See note 297 supra, and accompanying text.
330. 624 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1980).

331. The district court judge, incidentally, wrote an opinion (unreported) which failed to
cite to any authority whatsoever on any issue of the case.
332. FED. R. Crv. P. 65(a)(2).
333. 624 F.2d at 658. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1976). The case was ended by entry of a
consent decree in favor of plaintiff. 624 F.2d at 659.
334. 597 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 932 (1979).
335. 615 F.2d 252 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 202 S.Ct. 268 (1980) (hereinafter referred to as
Domino).
336. 628 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1980) (hereinafter referred to as Exxon).
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wrote the opinion in World Carpets II, but dissented in Exxon. No other
judge served on more than one of these panels. These cases will be criticized individually.
World Carpets I. In December 1977, Armstrong Cork Co. filed a declaratory judgment action seeking permission to change its corporate
name to Armstrong World Industries, Inc.8 7 World Carpets, Inc., which
had protested the name change on the basis of its incontestable registrations of the marks WORLD and WORLD plus a globe design used for
textile carpeting, filed a counterclaim alleging trademark infringement.
Armstrong and World were direct competitors in the carpeting market as
well as indirect competitors since Armstrong also manufactured and sold
hard surface floor coverings. After a five-day trial, a jury found that the
name change was likely to cause confusion and that "Armstrong World
Industries, Inc." was not a fair, descriptive use of the term "world" but
instead constituted an unfair deceptive act or practice. The trial judge,
who had previously refused to strike a demand for jury trial, decided to
treat the verdict as advisory. The reason was obvious: the jury awarded
no monetary damages (the name change was only proposed, not effected)
and a prayer for equitable relief alone does not create the right to trial by
jury. The trial judge adopted the jury's findings in his comprehensive and
well annotated opinion rendering findings and conclusions.
The Fifth Circuit, speaking through Chief Judge Brown in picturesque
rhetoric, 38

reversed the findings of fact made by both the jury and the

trial judge on the ground that both were "clearly erroneous." 3 9 Although
World Carpets' registrations were the only registrations of WORLD for
textile carpeting, the court justified its reversal partly on the existence of
eighty-five different companies using "World," not as trademarks, but for
retail trade names. Many of these companies were customers of the registrant. The court also relied on its impressions that "the Court [trial
court] based its findings of likelihood of confusion primarily upon findings of similarities in the companies' products and marks,"' 0 and that
"what the Court considered to be the 'substantial similarity' in the companies' marks was the deciding consideration leading to the Court's finding of likelihood of confusion.""' Judge Brown concluded: "The Court's
finding that Armstrong's proposed name and World's trademark are 'substantially similar' is clearly erroneous, and without this finding, the find337. Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
338. See note 196 and text accompanying note 193 supra.
339. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) provides, in pertinent part- "Findings of fact shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."
340. 597 F.2d at 501.
341. Id.
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ing of likelihood of confusion cannot stand." '
The court's lighthearted opinion" s can be attacked on many grounds,

not the least of which is the fact that the court misread the trial court's
opinion. That court did not hold that marks of the two companies were
"substantially similar," rather it stated that "[t]he carpet products are so
closely related that use of substantially similar marks would create a
strong likelihood of confusion.""" The court of appeals evidently passed
over paragraph 39 of the district court's opinion, appearing on the same
page, which indicated that the court was well aware of the various factors
relevant to the determinations of likelihood of confusion. 5 To characterize the trial court's opinion as being decided one-dimensionally is simply
not giving it a fair reading.
Secondly, and probably most perplexingly, the court reversed the findings of fact made not only by a judge, but also by a jury and a trial court,
average people, consumers, the very people the trademark laws are
designed to protect. It is incredible that a remote panel of judges would
reverse the findings of fact made by a jury after five days of trial. At a
trial both parties' advocates are present to explain why the challenged
activity is confusing or not confusing. No such opportunity exists in the
marketplace, a point which implies that an activity found to be confusing
in the courtroom is more likely to be confusing in the marketplace. Furthermore, reversing the trial court on a question of likelihood of confusion
is contrary to the overwhelming weight of precedent in the Fifth
Circuit.A6
342. Id. at 502.
343. See note 338 supra.
344. 448 F. Supp. at 1077 (Findings of Fact, paragraph 31; relied on by the court of
appeals, see 597 F.2d at 501) (emphasis added).
345. Id. at 1077. The entire paragraph stated: "Considerations relevant to the likelihood
of confusion include the similarity of design, similarity of products, identity of retail outlets
and purchasers, identity of advertising media utilized, the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers, and the existence of actual confusion," citing, Union Carbide Corp. v.
Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 381-82 (7th cir. 1976); Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O'Neal, 513
F.2d at 45.
346. The court has almost unfailingly affirmed trial court findings of likelihood of confusion even in many cases in which it would have been justified in reversing on a direct comparison of the marks. E.g., Penn Fishing Tackle Mfg. Co. v. Pence, 505 F.2d 657 (5th Cir.
1974) (per curiam-PENCO on fishing equipment did not infringe PENN); Pletz v. Christian Herald Ass'n, 486 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1973) ("The question of consumer confusion is one
of fact to be determined by the jury." Id. at 96. "Absent a clear abuse of discretion in
denying a motion for new trial, we must adhere to the jury's determination." Id. at 97.);
Holeinone, Inc. v. Intl Hole-In-One Club, Inc., 466 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1972) (per
curiam-affirmed even though parties used basically same mark for same services); McDonald's Corp. v. Moore, 363 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1966) (per curiam-factual issues supported by
substantial evidence. "We must affirm." Id. at 436); Sun-Maid Raisin Growers v. Sunaid
Food Products, Inc., 356 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1966) (per curiam-SUNAID for fruits not likely
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The authors' research has revealed only five cases in this area of the
law in which the Fifth Circuit has reversed the lower courts' findings of
facts on the ground of being clearly erroneous. Each can be distinguished
in pertinent respects.
In the Blue Shield case, 4 7 the court reversed the district court's holding that the use of RED SHIELD was likely to cause confusion when
used to advertise a substantially identical insurance program only when
the shield used was colored blue. Such a finding was patently ridiculous
since, as the Fifth Circuit noted, a "good part of the advertisement, in
fact, has been and is in newspapers or on television where color is seldom
shown.

3 48

Furthermore,

The word "shield" is the dominant portion of both word-marks. A
change in the modifying color word from blue to red cannot avoid confusion, at least where both are applied to services similar, indeed, almost
identical to the public mind, as in the present case. We need only to
compare the two symbols as they appear in the exhibits which are before
the Court and to mentally juxtapose the two word-marks as they appear
in print and as they appear to the ear to find that confusion is not only
likely, but probable.9
Finally, no jury made findings of fact in this case.
Nor were there jury findings in the Esso case. 50 While the court held
that the district court's findings were either clearly erroneous or the result of the application of an improper standard,8 5' the district court, in a
decision over sixty pages in length, 52 clearly stated in its Conclusions of
Law number 6:
The three contracts expressly define the rights and obligations of the
parties, and, therefore, such contracts rather than the general principles
relating to unfair competition, must govern. This controversy is a contract action and not a trademark action, and, whatever the applicable
law might be in the absence of the three contracts, is to be determined
according to the law of contracts and not according to the law of tradeto be confused with SUN-MAID for raisins); Frostie Co. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 341 F.2d 363
(5th Cir. 1965) ("The [court) must determine in its own opinion whether there is a likelihood of confusion, and it may not assume that the ordinary purchaser is thoroughly familiar
with the products of the two parties." 341 F.2d at 367); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Allstate Inv.
Corp., 328 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1964) (per curiam-no inclination to upset trial court findings
of no confusion).
347. 362 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1966). See note 110 supra, and accompanying text.
348. Id. at 378.
349. Id.
350. 363 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1966). See note 176 supra, and accompanying text.
351. Id. at 948-49.
352. 229 F. Supp. 586 (S.D. Miss. 1964).
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mark infringement of unfair competition."
Although the court did go on to make findings regarding confusion, it is
obvious that the court did not adequately consider the appropriate principles of trademark law.
In Hockey Emblem,s" the court implied that it was reversing the lower
court on clearly erroneous grounds,"G but then went on to say that the
lower court misunderstood the proper standard of "confusion" under the
Lanham Act. 3 " Therefore, the lower court had made an error of law, not
fact. In the Aladdin"7 case, the Fifth Circuit found, on the bases of physical evidence in the record and the dictionary meanings of "genie" and
"jinn," that the district court had erred in determining some underlying
facts. Again, the opinion reflects no indication that a jury had made any
finding. It is submitted that the court would have been authorized, indeed
commanded, by its prior decisions in the Caros " case and the Minute
Maids" case to reverse on the basis of the substantial similarity in the
marks themselves (two "I's" and one "d" vice one "I" and two "d's"). In a
clear case of copying the first user's mark in which the outcome turns
only on the comparison of the marks themselves, i.e., the first mark is not
descriptive of the goods which would require a determination of secondary meaning, the appellate court is certainly in the same position as the
trial court to compare the marks and should correct obvious mistakes.6 0
Finally, the court reversed the lower court as being clearly erroneous in
the Vision Center decision." 1 Once again it was in as good a position as
the trial court to decide the question, using the dictionary definitions of
"vision" and "center" to conclude the mark was descriptive of the goods
and services found in an optical store. No jury findings were made in the
case.

The situation in World Carpets II was different from that in any of the
foregoing five cases. Admittedly, "Armstrong World Industries, Inc.," as
portrayed on the proposed label which was in evidence, is not, when considered as a whole, "substantially similar" to WORLD or World Carpets,
353. Id. at 639.
354. 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975). See note 270 supra, and accompanying text.
355. "This court has held that the findings of a district court as to likelihood of confusion are factual and not to be overturned unless clearly erroneous." Id. at 1012.
356. "In this case, however, the district court overlooked the fact that the act was
amended to eliminate the source of origin as being the only focal point of confusion." Id.
357. 556 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1977). See note 229 supra, and accompanying text.
358. 240 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1957). See note 29 supra, and accompanying text.
359. 214 F.2d 792, (5th Cir. 1954). See note 41 supra, and accompanying text.
360. See note 349 supra, and accompanying text. See also Frostie Co. v. Dr. Pepper, 341
F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1965) (mere ocular exam).
361. 596 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1979) See note 259 supra, and accompanying text.
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Inc. in sound or appearance, although it would be if the word "World"
were emphasized. However, both the jury and the judge concluded, based
on all the evidence, that Armstrong's change of name would likely cause
confusion and, therefore, constituted an unfair and deceptive act or practice. The court of appeals was not in the same position to evaluate the
evidence as the trial court finders of fact and was clearly wrong in reversing their decision.
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit relied on the projected use of the new
name on proposed labels submitted by Armstrong in determining that no
"substantial similarity" existed because "Armstrong" was the attentiongetting feature. This conflicts with the well-known and established princi62
ple that the addition of a prefix or suffix does not obviate confusion.
The court's attempt to limit the impact of its decision in a footnote is
of little solace to trademark owners.
We caution that our holding is a narrow one. We merely hold that Armstrong may change its corporate name to Armstrong World Industries,
Inc. without infringing upon World's trademark rights. Our holding does
not give Armstrong carte blanche to use its new name in such a manner
that it infringes upon World's rights.*"
Domino. The court's reversal in the Domino case is the most detrimental opinion of its ilk since the disastrous decision in California Fruit
Growers Exchange v. Sunkist Baking Co."' The trial court had held 8 "5
that the owner of the famous and celebrated trademark DOMINO, registered for sugar, mustard, ketchup, salt, pepper, jams and jellies, salad
dressing, mayonnaise, and cucumber relish (all of which registrations
were incontestable), was entitled to a permanent injunction against the
defendant's use of the name DOMINO'S and DOMINO'S PIZZA in association with the sale of pizza, beverages, dough mix, dough packet mix
and other pizza ingredients as well as franchising, operating and supplying pizza restaurants. The court also held that defendants had falsely designated or represented the sponsorship or erftlorsement of their restaurants by employing plaintiff's mark DOMINO in violation of section
43(a),3" engaged in unfair competition, committed deceptive trade practices in violation of the Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
362. See Clinton Detergent Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 302 F.2d 745 (C.C.P.A. 1962);
W.E. Kautenberg Co. v. Ecko Products Co., 251 F.2d 628 (C.C.P.A. 1958).
363. 597 F.2d at 506 n.16.
364.

166 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1948) (SUN-KIST for bakery products held not to infringe

SUNKIST for fruit).
365. 205 U.S.P.Q. 140 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
366. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1976).
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Act,867 and diluted the distinctive quality of plaintiff's famous trademark.
The bases for the trial court's decision were: the celebrity of plaintiff's
mark which was used for at least sixty-five years prior to defendant's use;
defendant's knowledge, both actual and constructive, 8 ?Oof the DOMINO
mark which defendants admitted is a famous mark for sugar; consumer
studies showing that close to 100 percent of the public recognized the
DOMINO mark; a consumer study revealing that 44.2% believed a company which makes pizza makes other products and, of those consumers
who had such belief, 75 percent thought the other product was sugar; and
three instances of actual confusion. The court, to a large extent, adopted
the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by plaintiff's counsel.
In holding the findings of the trial court clearly erroneous, the appellate court relied primarily on the fact that the court "copied almost verbatim from proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted
by plaintiff's counsel,"'' stating "we can take into account the district
court's lack of personal attention to factual findings in applying the
clearly erroneous rule. '870 While it will be pointed out, infra, that this
decision conflicts on the merits not only with other decisions of other circuits, but also with decisions within the circuit, discounting the trial
court's findings conflicts with the holding by the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit in the famous Esso case. 7 1 In Esso, Judge Gardner stated:
It was not improper for counsel to prepare and present to the court proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the findings when
adopted and signed by the court became the court's findings. It is as
much the function of counsel to present his arguments and views as to
the facts as it is to present such argument and views as to the law. An
examination of the record convinces that the findings of the court are
sustained by abundant evidence.' 72
Judge Ainsworth's opinion in Domino cites three Fifth Circuit cases in
support of his position of looking askance at the trial court's findings, and
he quotes selectively from one of the cases.' 7 ' Wilson v. Thompson'7 and
James V. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co.' 75 are both cited for the proposition that an appellate court can feel more confident in concluding
367.

GA. CODE ANN. Ch. 106-7 (1968).

368. See 15 U.S.C. § i072 (1976).
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

597 F.2d at 258.
Id., (quoting Wilson v. Thompson, 593 f.2d 1375, 1384 n.16 (5th Cir. 1979)).
Esso, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 98 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1938).
Id. at 5.
615 F.2d at 258.
593 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1979).
559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977).
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that the trial judge erred when he adopted findings proposed by counsel.
Both of these opinions rely on Louis Dreyfus & Cie v. Panama Canal
Co. 87 ' as authority. Judge Ainsworth failed to read further in Louis Dreyfus, however, because the Fifth Circuit stated, "It must be remembered,
however, that... [w]hen substantial evidence supports a finding it will
not be found clearly erroneous merely because the expression of the finding was adopted from a proposal by counsel."187 The third case cited is
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Jahre7 8 in which the court concluded,
although not mentioned by Judge Ainsworth, "this Circuit does not suspend Rule 52(a) in such circumstances. When a district judge enters his
findings, they become formally his and are measured by the normal standard of review.''117
The finding by the court in Domino of dissimilarity of these related
goods conflicts with decisions of practically every other circuit.o Within
the Fifth Circuit, the Domino decision directly conflicts with other decisions concerning the question of whether likelihood of confusion may exist when the goods are related but noncompetitive. Particularly apropos
are cases involving food products. In the Beefeater case, 81 the use of
Beef/Eater for restaurants was found to be confusingly similar to the internationally known gin on the ground that both parties distributed or
sold consumable items, even though the restaurants did not serve alcoliolic beverages. The Minute Maid case82 held that MINUTE MADE for
frozen steaks infringed MINUTE MAID frozen juices. In Domino, this
ground of similarity was deemed insufficient.
Indeed, in disregarding its own cases, the court cited only one case in
support of its finding of dissimilarity of the respective goods. That was
376. 298 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1962).
377. Id. at 739.
378. 472 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1973).
379. Id. at 559.
380. Second Circuit, Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928) (locks
versus flashlights); Third Circuit, Wall v. Rolls-Royce, Inc., 4 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1925)
(automobiles versus radio tubes); Sixth Circuit, Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F.
509 (6th Cir. 1924) (hats versus magazines); Seventh Circuit, James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of
Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1976), on remand, No. 75C 385 (N.D. III., June 8,
1977), rev'd, 572 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1978) (gin versus restaurant services); Union Carbide
Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1976) (batteries versus light bulbs); Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1962) (optical and photo equipment versus
heating and refrigeration installation service); Eighth Circuit, Hanson v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 163 F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1947) ("Seventeen" case, dresses versus magazine); and
Ninth Circuit, Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.
1963) (Black & White Scotch Whiskey versus beer).
381. 572 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1978). See note 125, supra and accompanying text.
382. 214 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1954). See note 41 supra, and accompanying text.
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the infamous Sunkist case,38 an abberration which has been criticized
repeatedly by commentators for its overly restrictive approach. It no
longer reflects the state of law even in the Seventh Circuit from which it
emanated, as illustrated by the Beefeater and Ever-Ready cases.88 " Yet
the court quoted from Sunkist: "About the only things they have in common are that they are edible." 5
The court quoted one of the authors, "'Strong marks are widely protected, as contrasted to weak marks,' "'" but failed to quote the following
sentences:
A cigar maker began using JOHNNIE WALKER on qigars. His efforts
were short lived, however, for the Fifth Circuit quickly enjoined such use
on the basis of the strength of JOHNNIE WALKER and its symbol of a
walking man for whisky. Likewise, in the Black & White case the Court,
after specifically finding that the trademark BLACK & WHITE for
whisky was a strong mark, went on to enjoin its use by another for beer
despite the fact that plaintiff had never manufactured or sold beer and
had no intention of doing so. ESSO, an abbreviation for Standard Oil,
has been held to be "a coined word without inherent meaning" and entitled to exclusive use by its owner in a territory where it was never
used."7
It is both interesting and perplexing that the article was not cited by either party although its author was counsel of record.
Judge Ainsworth's opinion further creates a conflict both within the
Fifth Circuit and with other circuits regarding the extent to which DOMINO is entitled to protection against use on noncompeting goods. The
court's rationale was that several third parties had used and registered
the term DOMINO. The trial court had held that the third-party registrations, many of which were abandoned, had no bearing on Amstar's
rights, and thus the trial court had given little weight to the third-party
uses. The court's prior statements on the effect of third-party registrations (not uses) had been that such registrations cannot negate likelihood
of confusion. In Turner v. HMH Publishing Co.,s Judge Ainsworth also
writing for the court, held that the court would not assume any
knowledge on the part of the purchasing public by mere registrations
nor
889
would it assume that the marks were in continuous use.
383. 166 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1957).
384. See note 380 supra.
385. 615 F.2d at 261.
386. Id. at 259.
387. Lunsford, Trademark Basics, 59 TRADEMARK RzP. 873, 878-79 (1969).
388. 380 F.2d 224 (5th cir. 1967). See note 136 supra, and accompanying text.
389. See notes 145-46 supra, and accompanying text. See also, Hurricane Fence Co. v.
A-1 Hurricane Fence Co., 468 F. Supp. 975, 990 (S.D. Ala. 1979) ("The defendants having
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Other errors made by the court, recited for the sake of completeness,
include: (1) relying on a trademark examiner's passage to publication of
defendant's application to register as indicating no likelihood of confusion
(trial court correctly discounted its weight); (2) relying on the apostrophe
in DOMINO'S PIZZA to distinguish it; and (3) relying on plaintiff's lack
of vigilance in protecting its mark against use on unrelated goods (an
anomaly considering the court's decision to grant no relief on closely related products).
Finally, it is alarming that the court makes the following unsound and
inaccurate statement in its last paragraph: "However, '[tihe right granted
to the owner of a registered trademark is a monopoly and should not be
extended unless the owner is clearly entitled thereto'." 9
Exxon. The court's opinion in Exxon absolutely defies belief. The defendant, having been enjoined from using the mark TEXXON, changed
its mark and began using both TEXON and TEX-ON. After the district
court failed to find any likelihood of confusion, the Fifth Circuit showed
the good sense to reverse as to defendant's use of TEXON, but inexplicably affirmed as to its use of TEX-ON. Judge Brown, to his credit,
31
dissented .

Judge Sam D. Johnson, writing for the court, concluded "that EXXON
is a strong trademark deserving wide protection.'

Without doubt, EX-

XON, being a coined word with no inherent meaning, is deserving of the
greatest protection allowable by law. The court concluded that "[t]here is
a strong similarity between their wares and services. ' '139 Defendant en-

gaged in automotive repair services, substantially related to plaintiff's
business of providing petroleum products and related services.
The court should have stopped there in its overly careful analysis of all
the facts and should have enjoined completely and totally defendant's use
of TEXON and TEX-ON or any colorable imitation of EXXON. The
owner of a coined, arbitrary mark is certainly entitled to relief against an
infringer using a colorable imitation of its mark, especially when the business of the infringer is so substantially related. But the court could not
see the forest because the trees got in the way; its detailed consideration
of extraneous factors such as similarity of design of the marks, identity of
no right to the use of the mark have no standing to object to use of the marks by others.");
McNeil Labs, Inc. v. American Home Products Corp., 416 F. Supp. 804, 808 (D.N.J. 1976)
("In any event McNeil is under no obligation to bring actions against all infringers of its
mark in order to preserve its right to bring an action against AHP.").
390. 615 F.2d at 265, (quoting S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 266 F.2d 129, 136
(6th Cir. 1959)), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 820 (1959). Cf. note 182 supra, and accompanying
text (no-conflict between antitrust law and trademark law).
391. 628 F.2d at 508-09 (Brown, J., dissenting).
392. Id. at 504.
393. Id. at 505.

1232

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

advertising media, defendant's intent, and actual confusion caused it to
lose sight of the blatant infringement taking place. Only a consideration
of all the minutiae could lead to a dichotomous result turning on a simple
hyphen.
The court's opinion stressed twice, once in italics, that the survey evidence introduced "did not attempt to determine the confusion engendered by the mark Tex-On."'" The survey did not have to indicate anything. Precedent resolves this case immediately.
In Abramson v. Coro, Inc.8 " (CARO/CORO), Aladdin Industries v. Alladin Lamp & Shade Corp.3" (ALADDIN/ALLADIN), and Pure Foods,
Inc. v. Minute Maid Corp.$" (MINUTE MADE/MINUTE MAID), all
Fifth Circuit cases, the court held that a letter or two difference in spelling on the same or substantially related goods will not save an infringer.
In Wilson v. Delaunay'" (ZOMBIES/ZOMBIE), the Tenth Circuit held
that singular and plural forms are considered the same. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Johnson3" (ALLSTATE/ALL-STATE), a Third Circuit
case directly on point, the court held that "the interpolation of a hyphen
into the word Allstate will hardly distinguish the two names. ' 4 ° Additionally, a district court in Texas recently held that "Por-sha" infringes
PORSCHE when defendant was selling used Porsche automobiles and
401
also repairing and servicing the same.
Based solely on the equities of the case, the court should have enjoined
defendant completely. After being enjoined from using TEXXON, defendant started using TEXON and TEX-ON, obviously trying to move away
from the originally infringing mark as little as possible to take advantage
of the similarity with EXXON. Although the court found the evidence on
defendant's intent "mixed," it did state that "[tihere is some evidence in
the record indicating that the defendant intentionally adopted the marks
TEXON and TEX-ON in order to appropriate some of the good will as394. Id. at 506 (emphasis in original). Later in its opinion, the court stated, "Once again,
it should be noted that no survey evidence was introduced indicating a likelihood of confusion between Tex-On and EXXON." Id. at 507.
395. 240 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1957). See note 29 supra, and accompanying text.
396. 556 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1957). See note 230 supra, and accompanying text.
397. 214 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1954). See note 41 supra, and accompanying text.
398. 245 F.2d 877 (C.C.P.A. 1957).
399. 219 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1955).
400. Id. at 592. See also, Nashville Syrup Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 215 F.2d 527, 530 (6th
Cir. 1914) ("The specific form in which the mark is registered ... cannot be here controlling, whether the words 'Coca-Cola' are with or without a hyphen, or are in script or in plan
letters."); Stix Products, Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 494
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) ("The law of trademarks is not so unsophisticated as to permit an infringer
to escape liability by subtle variations of form."); Lunsford, Trademark Basics, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 873, 891-94 (1969).
401. Dr. Ing. H.C.F. Porsche AF v. Zim, 481 F. Supp. 1247 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
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sociated with the EXXON mark."'40 2 In such a situation, it is useful to
remember the humorous but wise words of District Judge Biunno:
The alterations made by defendants since the first protest in 1978 are
found insufficient. They are negligible and they are grudging. Having
been caught with a hand in the cookie jar, defendants cannot avoid the
claims by taking fewer or smaller cookies. They should have never
reached into the cookie jar in the first place, and having done so must
408
keep far away from it.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Judge Brown wrote in his dissent in Exxon:
The differences between me and a full concurrence in the scholarly
opinion of Judge Sam D. Johnson is not a sentence, a phrase or a word.
Indeed, it is not even a single letter. What, and all, that divides us is a
simple -.
The opinion properly REVERSES the trial court to forbid the use of
the term
TEXON
But it puts the imprimatur of law to permit the use of
TEX-ON
Now nearly a quarter of a century later this pricks my slumbering judicial conscience for having, in the very first week of my career, concurred
in a holding that a trial Judge could properly find no likelihood of consumer confusion between loaves of bread wrapped and labelled:
DANDY
DANDEE
Webb's City, Inc. v. Bell Bakeries, 226 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1955).
If confession is good for the soul. . . I wish belatedly to disavow this
earlier errancy by rejecting now the notion that confusion dissipates by a
simple hyphen.""

Trademark owners should be encouraged by Judge Brown's admission
of error in his prior thinking. It is hoped that others on the court will be
as open minded.
It is the authors' fervent hope that this analysis and critique of the
decisions and opinions of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals may be enlightening, both for its judges and for those of the new Eleventh Circuit-or at least for their law clerks-and the jurists on the trial bench.
This critique and review should serve, not only as a review of the deci-

sions of the court, but as a guidepost for future decisions, an impetus and
challenge to judges and their law clerks, and as a hornbook for the bar
402.
403.
404.

628 F.2d at 506.
Johnson & Johnson v. Quality Pure Mfg. Inc., 484 F. Supp. 975, 980 (D.N.J. 1979).
628 F.2d at 508-09 (Brown, J., dissenting).
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interested in the protection of intellectual property worth, collectively,
billions of dollars.

